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 1 
Summary 
Since 2001 the CJEU has repeatedly stated that, as a matter of EU law, any 
individual must be able to obtain compensation for harm suffered because of 
an infringement of EU competition law. As of today, victims of 
infringements of EU competition law are unable to effectively exercise that 
EU right. By introducing a Proposal for Directive, the Commission has 
taken a major step forward in promoting damages actions and private 
antitrust litigation within the EU. The main aim of the Proposed Directive is 
to ensure full compensation of victims of violations of competition law and 
to optimise the interaction between the public and private enforcement of 
EU competition law.  
 
The Proposal for Directive implements the passing-on-defence along with 
recognition of indirect purchaser standing into EU law. The US law and the 
EU law on the measures are based on different justifications. In US, features 
like the exclusive enforcement of direct purchasers, the litigation culture, the 
award of treble damages and the penalties for violations of the antitrust laws 
are all instruments clearly serving the aim of effectiveness and deterrence. 
In EU law, it is clear that priority has been given to the interest of fairness 
and the objectives of full compensation and consumer welfare.  
 
The passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing serves the overall 
EU objective of consumer welfare and the objective of full compensation. 
Following Manfredi case, the Proposed Directive implements a broad rule 
of standing to sue for damages. Clearly, the Proposed Directive aims at 
compensation, not at litigation. The indirect purchaser standing will 
facilitate the possibility for victims distant from the infringer, such as 
consumers, to obtain compensation in order to recover from a violation of 
competition law. The Proposed Directive places the burden of proof that the 
passing-on-defence applies on the infringer and implements a rebuttable 
presumption that the entire overcharge has passed on, for the indirect 
purchasers to rely on. Such solution facilitates damages claims for all 
claimants and a different solution would risk offending the EU principle of 
full effectiveness.  
 
In designing a litigation system based on EU competition law, the public 
and the private enforcement should play different roles. The public 
enforcement of the EU competition rules should aim at deterrence and 
effectiveness since the public enforcement never can serve the objective of 
compensation. In contrary, the private enforcement should primarily aim at 
compensation for victims of competition law infringements. An effective 
system of private damages actions, making liability for damages rule rather 
than exception, will however also serve the aim of deterrence to some 
extent, since the fear of infringers for liability of damages. To the extent 
possible, the public and private enforcement should therefore aim at 
complement each other. 
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Sammanfattning 
Sedan 2001 har EU-domstolen vid upprepade tillfällen framhållit att var och 
en som har lidit skada som orsakats av en överträdelse av EU:s 
konkurrensregler ska kunna kräva full ersättning för denna skada. Det har 
dock visat sig svårt för personer och företag som drabbats av en 
konkurrensskada att utnyttja denna EU-rättsliga rätt till ersättning. I syfte att 
främja skadeståndsprocesser baserade på konkurrensrätten har 
Kommissionen utfärdat ett direktivförslag. Avsikten med direktivet är att 
säkerställa att skadelidande vid överträdelser av konkurrensreglerna kan få 
full ersättning för den skada de lidit. Dessutom ämnar direktivet optimera 
samspelet mellan den offentliga tillämpningen och den privata 
tillämpningen av konkurrensreglerna.  
 
Direktivförslaget medför att så kallade övervältringsinvändningar kommer 
att accepteras i konkurrensrättsliga skadeståndsmål samt att indirekta kunder 
ges rätt att föra en skadeståndstalan baserad på konkurrensrätten. Olika 
motiv ligger bakom den amerikanska konkurrensrätten respektive den EU-
rättsliga konkurrenslagstiftningen, gällande övervältringsinvändningar och 
indirekta kunders rätt till ersättning. I amerikansk lagstiftning har de direkta 
kunderna exklusiv talerätt, konkurrensrättsliga skadestånd tredubblas 
automatiskt och det finns straffsanktioner för de som bryter mot 
konkurrenslagstiftningen. Alla dessa instrument syftar till att verka 
preventivt och avskräckande. I EU har istället det så kallade rättviseintresset 
prioriterats. Detta intresse ska främja målet att skadelidande vid 
överträdelser av konkurrensreglerna kan få full ersättning för den skada de 
lidit samt det övergripande EU-rättsliga målet avseende konsumentvälfärd.  
 
Införandet av ett övervältringsförsvar samt indirekta kunders rätt till 
skadeståndsanspråk är förenligt med det övergripande EU-rättsliga målet 
avseende konsumentvälfärd och målet att skadelidande till fullo ska bli 
kompenserad för liden skada. EU-domstolens dom i Manfredi innebär att 
det inte är förenligt med EU-rätten att begränsa rätten till skadestånd för 
personer som har lidit skada på grund av en överträdelse av 
konkurrensreglerna. Direktivförslaget medför att var och en som lidit sådan 
skada ges rätt att begära skadestånd. Direktivet placerar bevisbördan för att 
övervältring har skett på det företag som har begått överträdelsen samt inför 
en presumtion att övervältring av priset har skett till de indirekta kunderna. 
Förslaget underlättar således för skadelidande som befinner sig långt bort 
från skadegöraren i distributionskedjan (såsom konsumenter) att få 
skadestånd. En annan lösning hade riskerat kränka principen om EU-rättens 
fulla genomslag.  
 
Vid utformningen av systemet för konkurrensrättsliga skadestånd ska den 
offentliga och den privata tillämpningen av EU:s konkurrensregler syfta till 
att uppfylla olika mål. Den offentliga tillämpningen av konkurrensrätten kan 
aldrig uppfylla målet att till fullo kompensera skadelidande för överträdelser 
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av konkurrensreglerna. Den offentliga tillämpningen av konkurrensreglerna 
bör därför syfta till att verka preventivt och avskräcka från brott mot 
konkurrenslagstiftningen. Den privata tillämpningen bör å andra sidan 
huvudsakligen syfta till att kompensera skadelidande. Om Kommissionen 
lyckas skapa ett effektivt regelsystem för skadeståndsanspråk kommer den 
privata tillämpningen även i viss mån verka preventivt. Detta eftersom 
risken för omfattande skadeståndsansvar kommer verka avskräckande för 
företag. I den utsträckning det är möjligt bör därför den offentliga och 
privata tillämpningen syfta till att komplettera varandra.  
 
 
 
 4 
Preface 
I want to thank my supervisor Henrik Norinder for help and support in the 
process of writing this thesis.  
 
I also want to extend my gratitude to Vinge where I wrote this thesis as a 
thesis trainee, and especially to lawyer Grant McKelvey for inspiration and 
in-depth knowledge on the subject. 
 
Lastly, I want to thank Joel and my family for support and my friends for 
six great years in Lund! 
 
Stockholm, January 2014.  
Malin Berggren  
 5 
Abbreviations 
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common notion for the 
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e.g. for example 
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ungen 
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i.e. id est lat (“that is”) 
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no. number  
OJ Official Journal of the 
European Union  
p. page 
pp. pages 
para. paragraph 
paras. paragraphs 
Proposal for a Directive/ Proposal for a Directive 
Proposed Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council on certain rules 
governing actions for 
damages under national 
law for infringements of 
the competition law 
provisions of the Member 
States and of the 
European Union, 
COM(2013) 404 final 
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TEU  Treaty on European 
Union 
TFEU Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union 
TPN third party notice  
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The European competition law has been a story of progress. Regulation No 
17/62 was the first regulation implementing Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty. The Regulation was based on a prior notification system whereby 
restrictive practices of the kind that Article 101 concerned, required a 
decision of exemption by the Commission. The Regulation thus conferred 
the central role in the application and enforcement of EU competition law 
upon the Commission. Hence, the Commission had exclusive competence in 
monitoring the EU competition law and controlled the development of EU 
competition policy.  
 
In 2004 the so-called modernisation took place with Regulation 1/2003 
entering into force, replacing Regulation 17/62. The modernisation aimed 
at, among other things, decentralising the enforcement of EU competition 
rules and enhance a private enforcement of the rules. The Regulation 
implied that NCA and the national courts of the Member States were given a 
significant greater role in relation to the Commission, in comparison to their 
role in the prior system. Since the modernisation entered into force in May 
2004 all NCA are, alongside the Commission, in charge of public 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The NCA and the Commission 
are to fully apply the provisions of the TFEU in order to ensure that 
competition is not distorted or restricted. Private enforcement aims at the 
application of EU competition rules by the national courts in the Member 
States. The national courts are obliged to apply Articles 101 and 102 in 
order to protect the individual rights conferred to citizens by the Treaty and 
to ensure that the competition rules within the EU is applied and enforced 
effectively. Damages claims for breaches of Articles 101 and 102 are an 
important area of the private enforcement of EU competition law. The direct 
effect of the two Articles implies that an individual who has suffered harm 
because of an infringement of EU competition law has a right to damages. 
 
The right to damages based on EU competition law has evolved through the 
case law of the CJEU. The right to full compensation for harm suffered is 
guaranteed by the Treaty itself, however it has been difficult for the victims 
of competition violations to exercise this right in the national courts of the 
Member States. The right to compensation for victims of competition 
infringements has been a significant issue for the Commission for almost a 
decade. In 2005 the Commission published a Green Paper in order to 
identify the main obstacles to a more effective system for bringing damages 
claims and to present a series of proposals for further discussion. In 2008 
the Commission presented a White Paper on damages action with the main 
objective to ensure that all victims of infringement of competition law can 
obtain full compensation.  
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One of the measures discussed in the above Papers is if a defendant (the 
infringer of competition law) should be able to rely on the passing-on-
defence in an action for damages based on EU competition law. The 
passing-on-defence refers to defendants right to invoke as a defence against 
a damages claim that the claimant passed on all or part of the overcharge 
resulting from the infringement to its own customers further down the 
distribution chain (the indirect purchasers). The defence thus allows an 
infringer to escape liability in a damages action by a claimant to the extent 
of any pass on by that claimant. Closely linked to the passing-on-defence is 
the indirect purchaser standing, i.e. the indirect purchasers right to initiate a 
claim for damages in competition cases. 
 
Both the passing-on-defence and the standing of indirect purchasers have 
been denied under US federal antitrust law. To date, EU does not provide 
legislation regarding the issues and the national law of the Member States 
varies. The uncertainty regarding the existence of the passing-on-defence is 
therefore considered to be one of the major hurdles for an effective 
enforcement of private damages claims based on EU competition law.  
1.2 Purpose 
This thesis’ main purpose is to analyse the implementation of the passing-
on-defence into EU law. Since the issues of passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing are closely related, this thesis will also analyse the 
indirect purchaser standing in competition cases. Potential barriers in 
incorporating these measures into EU competition law and, above all, if 
such incorporation is practical, appropriate and desirable, will be discussed. 
 
In order to address the subject of this thesis in a proper way, the thesis will 
mainly focus on the following questions: 
 
1. Is the proposed EU law of passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser 
standing founded on the same justifications and values as the US 
law? If not, which distinguishing features can be found in the 
different jurisdictions? 
 
2. Do the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing serve the 
stated objective by the Commission in the Proposal for Directive of 
full compensation and the overall objective of consumer welfare 
within the EU competition law? 
 
3. Another objective of the Commission in the Proposal for Directive 
aims at optimising the interaction between the public and private 
enforcement. Which roles should the public and the private 
enforcement play regarding the implementation of passing-on-
defence in order to achieve this objective?  
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1.3 Method and Material 
This thesis is written using mainly a legal dogmatic method since such 
method well serves the aim of this thesis. In order to address differences and 
resemblances between the EU law and the US law regarding the passing-on-
defence and indirect purchaser standing, a comparative method and analysis 
is used. The thesis mainly concerns EU law, hence a EU legal method is 
used when interpreting the EU competition law. When applying and 
interpreting EU law, the CJEU mainly uses a teleological interpretation.1  
 
To date, EU law does not provide legislation regarding the passing-on-
defence and the Member States have dealt with the issue in different ways. 
Thus, the thesis will mainly discuss the Proposal for Directive by the 
Commission implementing the measures of passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing into EU law. The analysis will be based upon the 
approach taken by the doctrine and the Commission in the preparatory 
documents for the Proposed Directive as well as the final Proposal for 
Directive. In contrast to the EU law, the passing-on-defence is well 
established under US law, however controversial. In order to address the 
issue of passing-in-defence and the closely linked issue of indirect purchaser 
standing properly, the US law will be used as a comparative example. In US 
law, the passing-on-defence has been recognised for decades and is heavily 
debated in the judicial doctrine. It is therefore considered useful and suitable 
to compare the US system with the European one. Such comparative study 
will make it possible to better understand the solution chosen by the 
Commission in the Proposal for Directive as well as the future development 
of the EU competition law. 
 
The material reviewed in this thesis is mainly EU legislation, guidelines, 
recommendations, papers and preparatory work by the Commission, case 
law of the CJEU as well as national courts of the Member States, US case 
law and doctrine.   
 
The passing-on-defence is a relatively new area of EU law and there is a 
limited amount of material regarding the matter from a European 
perspective. The limited material also implies that the authority of the 
sources varies. The analysis and discussion have therefore to a large extent 
been based on the preparatory work by the Commission, as well as the 
commentators to the Green Paper and White Paper mentioned above. In 
regards to the US law, the doctrine is more comprehensive and has been the 
starting point for this thesis when explaining the practical use and 
consequences of the passing-on-defence, as well as when explaining the US 
law. Because of the rather few sources and material holding a European 
                                                
1 The CJEU also uses other methods and principles of interpretation, such as the 
comparative method and interpretation involving a comparison of different language 
versions, see case C-283/81 CILFIT mot Ministero della Sanità REG 1982 p. 3515, at para. 
18. See also Hettne (2011), pp. 158-170.    
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perspective, the sources will be reviewed critically, bearing in mind that the 
perspective is relatively limited.  
1.4 Delimitations 
The Proposal for Directive implementing the passing-on-defence has been 
preceded by extensive preparatory work. Within the limits of this thesis it is 
not possible, nor desirable, to discuss all these documents in detail. Further, 
a full examination of the EU competition law and the US antitrust law is 
neither possible nor appropriate within the scope of this thesis. The thesis 
will therefore focus on the main aspects of the passing-on-defence in the 
competition law of the EU and the US.  
 
Allowance of a passing-on-defence is often considered to complicate the 
antitrust litigation and damages actions in the courts. One major practical 
difficulty in allowing the defence is to estimate how much of the alleged 
overcharge that has been passed on to the indirect purchasers. Also, the size 
of the alleged initial overcharge to the direct purchaser must be determined. 
Another difficulty is to quantify the loss in sales that occurs when the direct 
purchasers are passing-on an overcharge downstream the distribution chain. 
There are several economic and econometric techniques available in order to 
overcome these difficulties, however these will not be discussed in this 
thesis. Such economic aspects mainly relate to the practical assessment of 
the defence in the national courts and do therefore not serve the purpose of 
this thesis. 
 
The US antitrust law regarding the passing-on-defence is comprehensive. 
The main aim in discussing the US law is to provide the reader a solid 
ground of knowledge regarding the passing-on-defence and to make the 
defence and its consequences understandable. Furthermore, the reference to 
the US law aims at putting the solution chosen by the Commission in 
perspective. To serve this purpose, the US law of the matter is briefly 
discussed and only the main cases from the US case law are analysed.     
 
As in regards to the indirect purchaser standing, the proposal of collective 
redress is of major practical importance. The measure of collective redress is 
also to be considered important for the overall understanding of the 
consequences in allowing the indirect purchaser standing. However, the 
subject is outside the scope of this thesis and will therefore only be 
discussed in brief. 
 
The aim is to provide a reader, assumed to possess basic knowledge of EU 
competition law, a solid base and an extensive, if not exhaustive, 
introduction to the issues of passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser 
standing. In order to do this, bearing in mind the complexity of competition 
law, the thesis is comprehensive, both in length and scope, since this has 
been regarded a necessity in order to analyse the measures of passing-on-
defence and indirect purchaser standing in a correct manner. 
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The thesis briefly examines the application of the passing-on-defence in 
three Member States: the UK, Germany and France. The Member States 
chosen are large economies within the EU and they all have significant 
influence on the EU law. Further, the selection of Member States has been 
made bearing in mind that these Member States represent both the common 
law system and the civil law system. 
1.5 Outline 
After the introduction chapter, the thesis starts with a brief presentation and 
overview of the EU competition law, explaining the historic development of 
the private enforcement of competition law within the EU. This part of the 
thesis is mainly descriptive, describing the emergence of a common 
competition law in Europe and the right to damages based upon it, as well as 
the overall objectives of the EU competition law.  
 
After the basic introduction, the passing-on-defence is described and 
examined. Since the EU law does not provide legislation regarding the 
matter, the passing-on-defence within the national legal systems of the UK, 
Germany and France is discussed.  
 
In the fourth chapter, the US federal antitrust law regarding the passing-on-
defence is discussed. In the analysis of the US law, both federal law and 
state law are examined to fully capture the different aspects that should be 
taken into consideration by the Commission introducing the passing-on-
defence into EU law.  
 
Chapter five constitutes the bulk of this thesis. The chapter contains the 
primary analysis of both the EU solution on the passing-on-defence and the 
preparatory work leading to the Proposal for Directive presented in June 
2013. In the chapter, the Green Paper and the White Paper are discussed as 
well as the arguments for implementing the passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing into EU law. The solution chosen by the Commission on 
the passing-on-defence in the Proposed Directive is then presented.   
  
The analysis and discussion part naturally aim at discussing the findings of 
this thesis. It is discussed if the implementation of a passing-on-defence into 
EU law will serve its stated purpose and the arguments justifying such 
implementation are closer analysed. Furthermore, the roles of the public 
enforcement and the private enforcement of EU competition rules are 
analysed and discussed. In the final section of this thesis the answers to the 
three questions asked above are presented in a summarising conclusion. 
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2 EU Competition Law 
2.1 The Development of EU Competition 
Law 
EU competition law is a complex subject, however of great practical 
importance since it sets the rules and control the everyday conduct of 
European businesses and industries. The law is an on-going story of 
progress and under constant development. The birth of a common European 
competition law can be traced back to the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, 
creating the European Coal and Steel Community.2 The Treaty contained 
basic competition provisions, including prohibition of both cartels and abuse 
of dominant position.3  
 
The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1957. The EEC Treaty included substantive competition provisions and 
held competition policy as a fundamental objective for the Community.4 
The present core provisions of EU competition law are stated in Article 101, 
which prohibits anti-competitive collaborations, and in Article 102,5 in turn 
prohibiting abuse of dominant position, both stated in the TFEU6. 
Traditionally, the enforcement of EU competition law has been centralised 
upon the Commission, largely due to the previous regulation dated back to 
1962.7 Up until 2004, the Commission had exclusive competence in the 
monitoring of the EU competition rules and could govern and control the 
development of competition law principles within the EU.8 As a 
consequence, the Commission’s workload increased and in combination 
with limited resources, their work became increasingly onerous. Hence, the 
Commission has for several years encouraged an increased private 
monitoring of the EU competition rules.9  
                                                
2 The Treaty of Paris in 1951 established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
The Treaty was ratified in June 1952 and the Common Market of Coal and Steel opened in 
1953. The Treaty is hereinafter referred to as the ECSC Treaty. 
3 Goyder and Albors-Llorens (2009), pp. 27-30. See Articles 4, 65 and 66 in the ECSC 
Treaty.  
4 Articles 85 and 86 in the EEC Treaty (the present Articles 101 and 102). The provisions 
were implemented in 1962 when the Council adopted Regulation 17/62, which laid down 
specific measures for the application of the competition rules. See Kerse and Khan (2012), 
p. 2. 
5 Previously Articles 85 and 86 respective Articles 81 and 82. In this thesis consistently 
entitled Articles 101 and 102. 
6 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (2007).  
7 Kerse and Khan (2012), pp. 2, 8 and 34. About Regulation 17/62, see footnote no. 4.    
8 The role of the Commission is often described as that of “Guardian of the Treaty”.  
9 Whish and Bailey (2012), pp. 295-296 and White Paper on Modernisation (1999), pp. 4-5 
and 19.  
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2.2 The Objectives of EU Competition Law 
The aims and objectives of EU competition policy have changed over time. 
Until the modernisation in 2004, EU competition law had two stated 
objectives: the promotion of effective competition in the Community and 
the promotion of European and single-market integration.10 More recently, 
post 2004, the Commission has established that the overall objective of the 
EU competition law is to create economic welfare in the EU, often referred 
to as maximising of “consumer welfare” and to ensure an efficient 
allocation of resources. Competition and market integration are considered 
to serve these goals.11  
 
Before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 3 in the EEC Treaty 
listed the necessary policies of the Community law in order to achieve the 
overall objectives of the Common Market. Article 3(f) held that activities of 
the Community should ensure that “competition in the common market is 
not distorted”. When implementing the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, Article 3(f) 
was removed and is now placed in a protocol annexed to the Lisbon 
Treaty.12 The relocation of Article 3(f) was initiated by the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy. Mr Sarkozy addressed the subject in a speech in which he 
questioned what competition has done for Europe.13 Regardless of the 
relocation of the provision, the CJEU has confirmed that the interpretation 
of EU competition law will remain the same and the relocation of Article 
3(f) seems to be no more than symbolic.14  
2.3 The Modernisation 
Plans to modernise EU competition law was first discussed in the late 
1990s. The Commission worked out a White Paper on modernisation, where 
several changes of the competition law system in Europe were proposed.15 
As part of the modernisation reform, Regulation 1/2003 was introduced 
replacing Regulation 17/62, and laying the groundwork for a further use of a 
more decentralised and private enforcement of Articles 101 and 102. The 
                                                
10 Craig and de Búrca (2011), p. 960 and Jones and Sufrin (2011), pp. 42-44. See also Jones 
(1999), pp. 25-26.   
11 See Goyder and Albors-Llorens (2009), p. 11, Whish and Bailey (2012), p. 23 and Jones 
and Sufrin (2011), pp. 42-43.  
12 Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition OJ C 115, 9.5.2008. 
13 European Council, Statement made by French President M. Nicolas Sarkozy at post-EU 
Council press conference, Brussels 23 June 2007. The speech is available at 
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-post-EU, 27.11.2013.      
14 In case C-52/09 TeliaSonera REU 2011 p. I-527 the Court held that “Article 102 TFEU 
is one of the competition rules referred to in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU which are necessary for 
the functioning of that internal market. The function of those rules is precisely to prevent 
competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual 
undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union.”, at 
paras. 21-22. See also Kerse and Khan (2012), p. 2. 
15 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty [1999], OJ C 132/1. 
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Regulation 1/2003 implied, inter alia, that the NCA and the national courts 
of the Member States were given a significant greater role in relation to the 
Commission, in comparison to their role in the prior system.16  
 
The aim of the modernisation and the implementation of Regulation 1/2003 
were to enhance an effective enforcement of the EU competition rules. The 
reform was embossed by three main objectives; first, it would enable the 
Commission to focus on the most serious infringements of competition law 
by ending the system of notification and authorisation while ensuring 
intensified ex post control.17 Further, it would reduce bureaucracy for 
companies while providing them sufficient legal certainty and thirdly, 
decentralise the enforcement application of competition rules with a 
particular focus on private antitrust enforcement and simultaneously 
maintain and create a common standard of the competition law.18 
2.4 The Enforcement of EU Competition 
Law 
2.4.1 The Public Enforcement 
Since the implementation of the modernisation in May 2004, the application 
of EU competition rules is commonly divided into public enforcement and 
private enforcement. Public enforcement refers to enforcement of 
competition law through the Commission and the NCA and aims at 
maintaining the protection for competition in the internal market.19 The 
NCA are, alongside the Commission, to fully apply Articles 101 and 102 of 
the TFEU in order to ensure that competition is not distorted or restricted. 
The Commission and the NCA may initiate proceedings acting on their own 
initiative, ex officio, or on a complaint.20 Further, they may impose fines on 
undertakings found to infringe the EU competition rules.21  
 
The parallel enforcement competence of the Commission and the NCA has 
resulted in the creation of a network of NCA together with the Commission, 
named the European Competition Network. The main objective of the 
Network is to promote a coherent application of the EU competition rules 
                                                
16 Jones and Sufrin, (2011), pp. 1026-1028. See also Regulation 1/2003 preamble (6) and 
(8). 
17 A directly applicable exception system replacing the ex ante control of the Commission 
was established and the exceptions in Article 101(3) became directly applicable.  
18 Komninos (2008), p. 84. See also the White Paper on Modernisation (1999), pp. 9-15, 
24-25 and 46. 
19 Jones and Sufrin (2011), p. 1301. Regulation No 1/2003 empowers the Commission and 
the NCA to apply Articles 101 and 102. Article 105 in TFEU gives the Commission 
competence to ensure that the application of the principles in Articles 101 and 102 are 
complied.   
20 Articles 5 and 7 in Regulation 1/2003. See also Articles 5-9 in Regulation 773/2004. It 
has been held that the Commission plays the role of investigator, prosecutor and judge in 
competition cases, see Jones and Sufrin (2011), p. 1026. 
21 Articles 3 and 4 in the Regulation 1/2003. See also Kerse and Khan (2012), p 34. 
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and to ensure efficient work sharing between the public enforces.22 
Although the Regulation 1/2003 creates a system of decentralisation and 
parallel competence between the NCA and the Commission, the 
Commission has wide powers in the application of the EU competition rules 
and is yet to be seen as the “watchdog” of the European competition 
policy.23 The EGC has in several cases stated that the Commission has an 
overall responsibility in the development and application of the EU 
competition law.24 According to the EGC the Commission’s task 
“encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in 
competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to guide the 
conduct of undertakings in the light of those principles”.25 
2.4.2 The Private Enforcement 
The national courts are obligated to apply Articles 101 and 102 in order to 
protect the individual rights conferred to citizens by the Treaty and to ensure 
that the competition rules in the EU is applied and enforced effectively.26 
Private enforcement of the competition rules aims to the situation that the 
parties take their claims before national court or arbitration.27 The 
application of competition rules in courts may result in nullity of the 
agreement or conduct in question, and the rules in the Treaty can also be 
used in action for an injunctive relief.28 The main advantage with the private 
enforcement is however that individuals and companies can sue for damages 
in domestic court in order to get compensation for the harm they have 
suffered because of the infringement of the competition rules. 
2.4.3 The Foundation of Private Enforcement  
Some fundamental principles of EU law are essential to the private 
enforcement of EU competition law since without these principles the 
matter of private enforcement would not exist.29 Already in 1963 the CJEU 
established the fundamental principle that the EU law does not only create 
obligations for the Member States, but also rights of individuals. These 
rights may be invoked by individuals in the national courts of the Member 
States, regardless of the national law of that Member State. The Court 
hereby established the principle of direct effect of the EU law.30 A year 
                                                
22 Jones and Sufrin (2011), pp. 1036 and 1152-1154. 
23 Jones and Sufrin (2011), p. 1026.  
24 See cases T-38/07 Shell Petroleum and Others v. Commission REU 2011 p. II-4383, 
para. 119, T-42/07 Dow Chemical and Others v. Commission REU 2011 p. II-4531, para. 
148 (appealed to the Court of Justice C-499/11 Dow Chemical and Others v. Commission 
18 July 2013) and T-31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri v. Commission REG 2002 p. II-1881, 
para. 166.         
25 T-38/07 Shell Petroleum and Others v. Commission REU 2011 p. II-4383, para. 119. 
26 Komninos (2008), p. 76. 
27 Whish and Bailey (2012), p. 295 and Regulation 1/2003 Article 6. See also Komninos 
(2008), p. 84. 
28 Article 101(2) TFEU. 
29 Jones (1999), pp. 45-47.  
30 See case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen REG 1963 p. 3. 
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later, the CJEU declared in the Costa case31 that the Member States have 
limited their sovereign rights and that EU law are supremacy the law on the 
Member States. The direct effect and the supremacy of the EU law creates 
the foundation of the EU legal system and the fundamental base for the 
private use of Articles 101 and 102. It is because of the directly applicable 
rights that individuals are given by the Treaty that the question of private 
enforcement of EU competition law arises.32  
2.5 Damages Based on the EU Law  
The right to damages based on the Treaty has evolved in the case law of the 
CJEU. In the Francovich case33, the CJEU established the foundation for 
state liability based on EU law:34 
 
“It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and 
damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for 
which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the 
Treaty”35, and  
 
“It follows from all the foregoing that it is a principle of Community law 
that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused 
to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held 
responsible.”36 
 
The importance of the principle established in the Francovich case is 
twofold. First, the case confirms the principle of a EU right to damages for 
individuals. Such right exists regardless of whether national law in a 
Member States recognise a right to damages in the specific case. 
Consequently, individuals within the EU have a right to obtain 
compensation for breach of the Treaty and this right is based directly on EU 
law, not national law.37 Secondly, as a consequence of the Francovich case 
the Member States themselves may be in breach of the EU law and their 
obligations under Article 4 in the TEU38. The EU law implies an obligation 
                                                
31 C-6/64 Costa v. E.N.E.L. REG 1964 p. 1141.  
32 Jones (1999), pp. 46-47. 
33 C-6/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy REG 1991 p. I-5357. 
34 Prior to Francovich case the CJEU in Humblet case (C-6/60 Humblet v. Belgian State 
REG 1960 p. 1125) stated that “[…]the Court rules in a judgment that a legislative or 
administrative measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State is contrary to 
Community law, that Member State is obliged, by virtue of Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty, 
to rescind the measure in question and to make reparation for any unlawful consequences 
which may have ensued. This obligation is evident from the Treaty and from the Protocol 
which have the force of law in the Member States following their ratification and which 
take precedence over national law.” at p. 569. 
35 C-6/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy REG 1991 p. I-5357, para. 35.  
36 C-6/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy REG 1991 p. I-5357, para. 37. 
37 Jones (1999), p. 71. 
38 In Article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the principle of sincere 
cooperation is declared, holding that the Member States shall take any appropriate measure 
to “ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts 
of the institutions of the Union”. 
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for the Member States to provide fully effective judicial remedies and to 
provide protection of the rights granted by EU law to individuals, including 
damages.39  
 
In subsequent joined cases Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III40 the 
CJEU stated that individuals right to rely on the direct effect of provisions 
of the Treaty before the national courts “is only a minimum guarantee and 
is not sufficient in itself to ensure the full and complete implementation of 
the Treaty”.41According to the Court, the purpose of this principle is to 
ensure the EU laws supremacy of national provisions. The judgment 
clarifies that the rules that establish liability are the rules that creates rights 
of individuals, i.e. the direct effect.42 Furthermore, the Court held that “the 
full effectiveness of Community law would be impaired if individuals were 
unable to obtain redress when their rights were infringed by a breach of 
Community law”.43 Regarding the calculation of damages, the Court held 
that the domestic law should determine the criteria for the damages, 
however the national regulations governing the damages must not render it 
practically impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation.44 
2.6 Damages for Breach of EU 
Competition Law 
In 1973, the CJEU in the BRT v. SABAM case45 confirmed the direct effect 
of Articles 101 and 102. The Court held that the Articles create direct rights 
in respect of the individuals concerned and that the national courts must 
safeguard these rights. Further, the case clarified that a regulation cannot 
deprive individuals of directly effective rights held under the Treaty.46 In the 
subsequent Delimitis case47, the CJEU ruled that the competence to apply 
the Articles 101 and 102 is shared between the Commission and the national 
courts. Hence, the national courts are obliged to protect the individual rights 
guaranteed by the Treaty when applying the EU competition law.48  
                                                
39 Jones (1999), pp. 72-73. 
40 C-46/93 Brasserie du pêcheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen / Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others (joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93) 
REG 1996 p. I-1029. Hereinafter referred to as Factorframe III. 
41 The Factorframe III case, para. 20. 
42 See the Factorframe III case, paras. 22-23.  
43 See the Factorframe III case, para. 20. 
44 The principle of effectiveness.  
45 C-127/73 BRT v. SABAM REG 1974 p. 51. 
46 Jones (1999), p. 49. 
47 C-234/89 Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu REG 1991 p. I-935. 
48 C-234/89 Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu REG 1991 p. I-935, para. 45. In the case the Court 
refers to case C-127/73 BRT v. SABAM REG 1974 p. 51, in which the CJEU held that 
Articles 101 and 102 had direct effect and that these Articles create direct rights in respect 
of the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard, at para. 16. 
Following the judgment in Delimitis the Commission issued the so called “Co-operation 
Notice” in order to encourage a private enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 in the national 
courts of the Member States. See the Notice on Co-operation between National Courts and 
the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty OJ C/39/6 [1993].     
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Concerning the matter of damages based on breach of EU competition law, 
the judgment in Courage case49 is regarded as the landmark case.50 In the 
case, the CJEU recognised a right to damages in case of infringement of 
competition law. Further, the Court for the first time directly commented on 
the civil consequences, in addition to invalidity, resulting from a violation of 
the EU competition rules and expanded the principle established in the 
Francovich case to include individual infringements of the competition 
rules. According to the Court, effective protection of the rights granted by 
the Treaty requires that individuals who have suffered a loss due to an 
infringement of Articles 101 or 102 have a right to claim damages. The 
Court emphasised the direct effect of Article 101 in relations between 
individuals and that the national courts must safeguard the rights created by 
the Article. Further, the CJEU held that actions for damages in the national 
courts could be a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective 
competition within the EU. The Court clarified that domestic law does not 
prevent individuals from claiming their rights under the Treaty and the 
national courts must ensure that the EU law is fully effective. It was 
considered that this principle could be eroded if not every person who 
suffered a loss due to an infringement of competition law could obtain 
compensation.51 
 
The principle established in the Courage case was clarified in subsequent 
Manfredi case in 2006.52 The Manfredi case was a preliminary reference 
case from Italy, where the Italian Competition Authority (upheld on appeal 
by the Council of State) had found that a number of insurance companies 
had exchanged information in violation with the Italian competition law. 
Customers of the insurance company brought actions before the Italian court 
to obtain damages based on both Italian and EU competition law. The 
national court submitted questions to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU 
regarding the interpretation of Article 101. The CJEU repeated its statement 
in the Courage case and clarified that the full effectiveness of Article 101 
requires that “any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered 
where there is a causal relationship between the harm and an agreement or 
practice prohibited by Article 101”.53 
 
In the Manfredi case the Court made a distinction between the existence and 
the exercise of the right to damages. According to the Court, the existence 
of a right to damages is a matter of EU law, however the exercise of such 
right is a matter for the domestic law of the Member States, subject to the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness.54 Regarding the calculation of 
                                                
49 C-453/99 Courage and Crehan REG 2001 p. I-6297. 
50 Whish and Bailey (2012), p. 298. 
51 In the case the CJEU emphasised the primacy of Article 101 in the EU law and held that 
“Article 85 of the Treaty constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the 
functioning of the internal market” at para. 20. See also case C-126/97 Eco Swiss REG 
1999 p. I-3055, para. 36. 
52 C-295/04 Manfredi REG 2006 p. I-6619. 
53 C-295/04 Manfredi REG 2006 p. I-6619, para. 61. 
54 The Manfredi case, paras. 61 and 64. See also Whish and Bailey (2012), pp. 299-300. 
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the damages granted in competition matters, the Court made the significant 
statement that the damages awarded shall cover both compensation for the 
actual loss and the loss of profit plus interest.55  
 
Since the Manfredi case it is clear that any individual has a right to damages 
as long as there is harm, a breach of competition law and a causal 
relationship between the harm suffered and the infringement of competition 
law.56 In the subsequent Otis case57, the CJEU confirmed the requirement of 
a causal relationship in order to obtain compensation.58 The questions of 
quantification of the loss and the requirement of causal relationship were 
however for the national court to assess.59     
 
Since 2001 and the ruling in the Courage case it is clear that, as a matter of 
EU law, individuals have a right to obtain compensation based on an 
infringement of EU competition law. The modernisation in 2004 opened the 
door for an increased private enforcement of competition law, however 
some obstacles in the national law of the Member States has remained as 
regards damages actions based on EU competition law. The ineffectiveness 
of private antitrust damages actions is largely due to various national legal 
and procedural hurdles of the Member States.60 One of the most prominent 
problems is that Member States retain the procedural rules of their domestic 
judicial system or that their substantive rules for damage compensation 
inhibit successful damages claims.61 In order to identify and analyse the 
obstacles in obtaining successful damages actions and a more active private 
antitrust enforcement the Ashurst Report62 was carried out for the 
Commission in August 2004.63 The results of the report showed that “the 
picture that emerges from the present study on damages actions for breach 
of competition law in the enlarged EU is one of astonishing diversity and 
total underdevelopment”.64 This motivated the Commission to publish a 
Green Paper65 for public consultation in 2005.66  
                                                
55 See the Manfredi case, paras. 94-100. 
56 See Komninos (2011), pp. 448-449. 
57 C-199/11 Otis and Others 6 November 2012.  
58 See the Otis case, para. 43.   
59 See the Otis case, para. 65. 
60 Becker, Bessot and De Smijter (all at DG Competition in Brussels) (2008), p. 2.   
61 Whish and Bailey (2012), pp. 299-300. See also the former Advocate General Van 
Gerven who believes that the underdevelopment of private actions in Europe depends on 
several obstacles, such as the absence of a statutory basis for bringing suits based on EU 
competition law, institutional problems, limitations on the aggregation of damages claims, 
difficulties in proving the existence of a causal relationship and the extent of harm, 
uncertainty in the existence and the extent of the “passing-on-defence” and uncertainty in 
the calculation of damages. Another obstacle is the problem regarding full recovery of costs 
and fees. See Van Gerven (2005), p. 1. 
62 The study was performed by the Ashurst lawfirm.  
63 Whish and Bailey (2012), p. 296.  
64 The Ashurts Report, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of 
infringement of EC competition rules, p. 1. 
65 Commission Green Paper Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005. 
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2.7 The Green Paper 
As described above, the Commission had been in favour of an enhanced 
private antitrust enforcement within the EU for several years. Since having 
received the full support of the CJEU in the Courage case, the Commission 
quickly initiated a Green Paper in order to facilitate actions for damages for 
breach of EU competition law.67 The purpose of the Green Paper was to 
identify the main obstacles in the promotion of actions for damages for 
competition infringements and to present a series of proposals for further 
discussion. The Paper aimed to encourage and stimulate a debate and to 
generate feedback from the stakeholders on the proposals.68 The Paper 
emphasised that an increased private antitrust enforcement would have 
several advantages for private parties.69 According to the Commission, the 
most fundamental advantage was the right for victims of violations of the 
competition law to recover. Another advantage was the facilitation of 
damages claims that would make it easier for consumers and firms to 
recover their losses due to an infringement of competition law. It was also 
considered that an enhanced private enforcement would deter from anti-
competitive behaviour and bring the competition law closer to the citizens 
of the Member States. The Paper stressed that such enforcement regime 
would strengthen the enforcement of competition law in general.70 
 
The main obstacles identified by the Commission in the promotion of 
damages actions based on the EU competition law were: the access to 
evidence, the requirement in many Member States of fault to be proven, the 
scope of the damages claim and the calculation of the damages, the passing-
on-defence and the indirect purchaser standing, the defending of consumer 
interests, the costs of actions, the coordination between public and private 
enforcement and the issues of jurisdiction and applicable law. Regarding the 
scope of the damages, the Commission considered introducing double 
damages into EU competition law, however this was not implemented in the 
Proposed Directive.71 The Green Paper72 listed different options in order to 
encourage private damages actions and to establish a more litigation-based 
system of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. The Paper had several 
proposals on how to handle the passing-on-defence in EU law, which will 
be further discussed in section 5.2.   
                                                                                                                        
66 The Green Paper (2005). See also the Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the 
Green Paper. The Staff Working Paper discusses the issues and proposals identified in the 
Green Paper in more detail. 
67 See Komninos (2011), p. 450. 
68 Ibid., p. 451. See also Press release IP/05/1634, 20.12.2005. 
69 Ibid., p. 451. 
70 The Green Paper (2005), p. 3 and the Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the 
Green Paper (2005), pp. 6-7. See also Press release MEMO/05/489, 20.12.2005. 
71 See the Green Paper (2005). The discussion of double damages at p. 7.  
72 The Green Paper (2005) together with the Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the 
Green Paper (2005).  
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2.8 The White Paper 
In April 2008 the Commission published a White Paper73 on damages 
actions.74 In the Paper, the Commission emphasises that the right to 
compensation is guaranteed by the EU law as stressed by the CJEU in the 
Courage and Manfredi cases. The Paper presents a number of proposals in 
order to ensure that all victims of infringement of competition law have 
access to effective redress mechanisms.75 The primary objective of the 
Paper is to guarantee that all victims of competition law violations are fully 
compensated for the harm that they have suffered. Thereof, full 
compensation is said to be the foremost guiding principle that will permeate 
the European antitrust litigation system.76     
 
The Paper presents a number of measures to improve the ability to bring a 
successful claim for damages in competition cases. In brief, the Paper 
proposes that: collective redress should be a possible measure in 
competition cases, the national courts should be able to order parties to 
disclose relevant evidence, decisions of NCA shall have the status of 
binding proof in civil proceedings and strict liability for damages in 
competition cases should apply (no fault requirement).77 Further, full 
compensation should be available for victims of competition infringement 
covering not just actual losses but also lost profit and interest. The Paper 
suggests that both the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing 
should be recognised under EU law.78 According to the Paper, there are 
several legal and procedural obstacles in the Member States’ legal systems 
concerning the rules governing actions for damages based on competition 
law before the national courts.79 The Commission therefore considers that 
there is a need for EU legislation in order to obtain effective private actions 
for damages.80 
                                                
73 A White Paper is a paper that contains proposals for EU action in a specific area. It 
sometimes follows a “Green Paper” published to initiate a process of consultation at 
European level. The Green Papers thereby sets out a number of ideas and proposal for 
public discussion and debate while the White Papers contain official proposals in a specific 
area of EU policy and law. A White Paper often precedes EU legislation.  
74 Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules 
COM(2008) 165 final. See also the Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the 
White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules SEC(2008) 404, 
2.4.2008 which in more detail explains the proposals and the underlying considerations in 
the White Paper, and the Impact Assessment Study Making Antitrust Damages Actions 
More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios, Final Report for the 
European Commission, 30.5.2005 which analyses the costs and benefits of various options.   
75 The White Paper on Damages Actions (2008), pp. 2-10. 
76 Ibid., p. 3. 
77 Punitive damages are not implemented into EU law, however the Commission stresses in 
its Staff Working Paper that punitive damages are not contrary to the European order and 
Member States can award such damages under national law for violation of national 
competition law, para. 190 in the Commission Staff Working Paper (2008).  
78 The White Paper on Damages Actions (2008), pp. 2 and 7. 
79 Ibid., p. 2. 
80 The Commission Staff Working Paper (2008), para. 321. 
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The Paper emphasises that the legal framework for damages actions should 
be based on a “genuinely European approach”.81 The concern among many 
stakeholders and practitioners that the EU competition law should follow 
the US antitrust law system with excessive litigations and tremble 
damages82 is thereby rejected by the Commission. Instead, the White Paper 
is said to include measures and proposals that are rooted in the European 
legal culture and traditions. Moreover, the Commission stresses the 
importance in maintaining a strong public enforcement of the European 
competition rules. The measures proposed in the White Paper are therefore 
to be seen as complement, and not replacement, of the public enforcement.83  
 
The White Paper has been subject for an intense debate and several Member 
States and stakeholders have submitted comments in the public 
consultation.84 It has been held that the proposals may lead to a US style 
system that undermines the “European legal culture and traditions” that the 
Commission is trying to preserve.85 Several stakeholders question the 
Commission’s authority to legislate in the area and some have explicitly 
rejected that there is a need for EU legislation.86 However, in June 2013 the 
Commission proposed legislation in order to facilitate damage claims by 
victims of antitrust violations. According to the Commission a directive is 
the most appropriate instrument and based on the White Paper, the 
Commission has presented a proposal for directive to the European 
Parliament and the Council.87    
 
The White Paper and its proposals on the passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing will be further discussed in section 5.3 of this thesis.   
                                                
81 The White Paper on Damages Actions (2008), p. 3. 
82 In the US, damage awards based on infringement of US federal antitrust law are 
automatically trebled, see section 4.1 below.   
83 The White Paper on Damages Actions (2008), p. 3. See also Komninos (2008), p. 86 and 
Becker, Bessot and De Smijter (all at DG Competition in Brussels) (2008).   
84 The Comments on the White Paper on Damages Actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html, 
29.10.2013. See also the Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report 
(2013), p. 6.  
85 See the joint comments of the American Bar Association section of Antitrust law, section 
of International law and section of Business law, p. 3.    
86 See for example the comments of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP and the 
comments of The Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland and the comments of the 
Business Europe (the Confederation of European Business). See also the Commission Staff 
Working Document, Impact Assessment Report (2013), pp. 7-8. 
87 See the Press release MEMO/13/531, 11.6.2013.    
 23 
3 The Passing-on-defence 
3.1 A Brief Introduction 
Suppose that a number of book producers have been involved in a cartel and 
entered into a price-fixing agreement for several years. The price paid by the 
immediate customers of the producers, i.e. the suppliers (the direct 
purchasers)88, will be higher (let us say five per cent) than it would have 
been in absence of the price-fixing agreement. However, the supplier will 
adjust the price of the goods to his or her costs in order to obtain a profit 
margin and thus the five per cent price increase may be “passed on” to the 
supplier’s own customers (the indirect purchasers)89.90 Thereby, any 
overcharge (the five per cent) due to the illegal cartel will be passed on 
further down the distribution chain and, eventually, end up at the final 
consumer.91 Hence, the overcharge from the producer has been compensated 
for when the supplier sells the books to his own customers. This situation 
give rise to two questions: firstly, can the infringer of competition law (the 
producer in this example) escape liability in a damages action of the supplier 
to the extent that the overcharge has been passed on to the suppliers own 
customer? In other words, can the producer invoke as a defence that the loss 
of the supplier has been passed on and thereby that the supplier has not 
suffered any loss (i.e. harm)? If the extra costs are passed on, the direct 
purchaser has already been compensated and a reward of damages would 
create a double compensation and an unjust enrichment.92 Secondly, there is 
the question of the indirect purchasers’ standing; if the producer can claim 
as a defence that the extra costs have passed on, can the indirect purchasers 
bring an action for damages against the price-fixers (the producer in this 
example), for the costs that has been passed on to them?93  
 
In short, the passing-on-defence gives rise to two different issues: the 
liability of the infringer and the position of the indirect purchasers. The first 
issue described above, i.e. the infringers possibility to escape or mitigate 
liability by claiming that the overcharge has passed on to the downstream 
buyers, is called passing-on-defence.94 The passing-on-defence can be 
invoked by the defendant (the infringer) not only against the direct 
purchasers but also against the indirect purchasers who is not final 
consumers. This is due to the fact that also the indirect purchasers can have 
customers on whom the overcharge can be passed on upon. Hence, the issue 
                                                
88 Often referred to as “the direct purchaser” or “the direct customer”. 
89 The customers of the supplier may be other undertakings or final consumers and are often 
referred to as “the indirect purchaser” or “the indirect customer”.  
90 Strand (2010), p. 3.   
91 Whish and Bailey (2012), p. 300. 
92 Ibid., p. 300. See also Strand (2010), p. 3 and Petrucci (2008), p. 33.  
93 See Whish and Bailey (2012), p. 300 and Strand (2010), p. 3. 
94 Petrucci (2008), p. 33. 
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of passing-on concerns all claimants who are not final consumers.95 The 
second issue above refers to the standing of the indirect purchasers and their 
right to claim damages when the overcharge has been passed on to them.   
 
The issues of passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing include 
three main elements:  
 
(i) The fairness interest which requires that every victim of an 
illegal behaviour who has suffered a loss should be entitled to 
claim damages in order to recover, 
 
(ii) The interest of effectiveness according to which the private 
enforcement aims at deterrence of anti-competitive behaviour, 
and, 
 
(iii) The efficiency interest by which the questions of judicial 
economy and potential burdens on the legal system must be 
taken into consideration.  
 
By nature, these interests may be incompatible and in conflict with each 
other. For example, the interest of fairness requires that all individuals who 
have suffered harm should be able to recover, however this may 
unavoidable conflict with the interests of effectiveness and efficiency.96 It 
has been argued that there is a fundamental conflict between the interests of 
fairness and deterrence and that competition policy should exclusively aim 
at accomplish the second one.97 Therefore, in order to achieve the objective 
of deterrence the direct purchasers should have monopoly in standing, since 
they are closer to the infringement of competition law and have better access 
to information and evidence, and consequently enjoys better prospect in an 
action for damages.98 There are however inconsistency among the doctrine, 
and some argue that both the interest of fairness and the interest of 
deterrence require standing for the indirect purchasers.99 
3.2 The Law of Passing-on-defence in 
Three Member States  
To date, EU does not provide legislation concerning the matter of passing-
on-defence and indirect purchasers standing. In several Member States it has 
been uncertain whether or not the passing-on-defence is recognised as a 
legal measure. Below, the passing-on-defence in the UK, Germany and 
France is briefly examined with the main features of the law taken into 
consideration. 
                                                
95 Strand (2010), p. 14.  
96 Cengiz (2007), p. 8. 
97 Landes and Posner (University of Chicago Law Review 1979), p. 604.  
98 Ibid., p. 609. 
99 Harris and Sullivan (1980), pp. 273 and 354.  
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3.2.1 The United Kingdom 
Reforms in order to obtain a stronger system for private actions in 
competition law where proposed in the UK in 2012.100 In the consultation 
regarding the reform, the government confirmed that the existing regime of 
private actions is not working and especially that small companies and 
businesses as well as consumers are unable to reach justice through private 
actions.101 Regarding the passing-on-defence, the government held that the 
defence will not be recognised in legislation.102 Since legislation on the 
matter was rejected, it is unclear whether or not the defence is recognised 
within the UK.103 Many of the responders of the consultation held that the 
defence is already available under English law and that legislation regarding 
the matter is likely to advantage either direct purchasers or indirect 
purchasers at the expense of the other.104 This is however a controversial 
issue in the UK and several commentators are of the opposite opinion and 
argues that there is no passing-on-defence available under English law, 
though the law already deals with the issue by other means.105 Furthermore, 
some responders in the consultation held that the passing-on-defence is 
nothing else than a reflection of the principle that any person claiming 
damages must prove that he has suffered a loss.106 Summarised, no reason 
for legislation regarding the passing-on-defence was found by the UK 
government as the matter will be better addressed through evolving in case 
law. Consequently, the question of passing-on-defence in English law is not 
definitely resolved.107         
3.2.2 Germany 
In Germany, the majority of the doctrine consider the passing-on-defence 
available under German law, however it is difficult to successfully plead in 
practice. The 7th amendment of the German Act against Restraints of 
                                                
100 In April 2012 the ministerial department ”The Department for Business, Innovation & 
Skills” (BIS) in the UK presented a consultation on options for reforms on private actions 
in competition law. The BIS-consultation Private Actions in Competition Law: a 
consultation on options for reform April 2012.   
101 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills Private Actions in Competition Law: 
A consultation on options for reform – government response January 2013.    
102 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills Private Actions in Competition Law: 
A consultation on options for reform – government response January 2013, pp. 23-25.  
103 Which and Bailey (2012), pp. 310-311. 
104 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills Private Actions in Competition Law: 
A consultation on options for reform – government response January 2013, p. 24. 
105 Sheehan, Duncan (2012). According to Sheehan, the so called passing-on-defence is not 
a defence, it is a question of quantification of loss and loss allocation between claimants. 
See also Whelan, Peter (2012). Whelan is of the opinion that the passing-on-defence should 
be recognised by legislation in English law. In an article from 2005 Greg Olsen (partner at 
Jones Day in London) held that the English courts are likely to recognise the passing-on-
defence since an exclusion of the defence would conflict with established compensatory 
principles on which damages are usually awarded in the UK, see Olsen (2005).  
106 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills Private Actions in Competition Law: 
A consultation on options for reform – government response January 2013, p. 24. 
107 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills Private Actions in Competition Law: 
A consultation on options for reform – government response January 2013, p. 25. 
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Competition108 provides:  
“If a good or service is purchased at an excessive price, a damage shall not 
be excluded on account of the resale of the good or service”109. 
Most legal commentators agree that the amendment limits the scope of the 
passing-on-defence, but does not exclude it. Hence, the defence is restricted 
under German law, however it is unclear to what extent and in which 
way.110 The scope of the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing 
was however clarified in 2011 when the German Supreme Court111 found 
that indirect purchasers as well as direct purchasers can claim damages 
against cartel members. Further, the German Supreme Court found that 
cartel members are entitled to invoke the passing-on-defence by claiming 
that the defendant has passed on the overcharge to its own customers.112 The 
judgment entails that the passing-on-defence is available under German law, 
however the defendant invoking the defence has the burden of proving that 
the costs and overcharge has been passed on down the distribution chain.113 
In order to avoid the risk of awarding multiple damages for the same 
damage, direct and indirect purchasers are treated as joint creditors in the 
case law of the Higher Regional Court of Berlin. The direct purchaser is 
responsible of allocating damages to the various levels of the distribution 
chain concerned and distributing the awarded compensation accordingly.114 
This approach by the Court of Berlin has been criticised as such assumes 
that the customer side has common interests, which in the critics opinion 
does not exists. It has been held that the risk of multiple liability is limited 
since the indirect purchasers often are far from the infringer in the 
distribution chain. Accordingly, it is difficult for the indirect purchasers to 
show the causal relationship required and to quantify the alleged losses 
suffered.115 In order to solve such procedural problems, it is possible for the 
defendant in a German competition case to emit a so-called third-party 
notice (TPN). This implies that the defendant (the infringer) will inform 
uninvolved parties of the proceedings, if the claimant has not brought a joint 
action against the infringer of competition law. The Federal Supreme Court 
in Germany has confirmed that a TPN can be issued in a cartel case in order 
for the infringer to avoid being held liable twice for the same damage by 
direct and indirect purchasers.116 
                                                
108 The ”Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen” (GWB) in German.  
109 Section 33(3) in the GWB.  
110 Blanke and Nazzini (2012), pp. 292-293 (chapter Germany, pp. 279-366). See also 
Thomas (2005). 
111 The Bundesgerichtshof in German.  
112 See the judgment of the German Supreme Court of 28 June 2011, KZR 75/10. The case 
is often referred to as the Carbonless Paper Cartel case. 
113 See Komninos (2012). 
114 Blanke and Nazzini (2012), p. 286. 
115 Blanke and Nazzini (2012), pp. 286-287. 
116 Ibid., p. 306.  
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3.2.3 France 
The passing-on-defence is available in the French competition law. The 
France Commercial Court of Nanterre accepted the defence in the 
judgement of the La Roche case117 in 2006. The Supreme Court in France 
confirmed the approach against the passing-on-defence in a more recent 
decision from 2010.118 In contrast to German law, the burden of proof in 
French law is placed upon the claimant (the direct purchaser). The 
placement of the burden of proof entails that the direct purchaser must show 
both that he or she has suffered a loss (since the overcharge was not passed 
on) and that he or she could not mitigate the loss suffered by passing-on the 
overcharge further down the distribution chain.119 The judgment has been 
criticised since the placement of the burden of proof on the claimant 
imposes a significant hurdle for the claimant in question that may violate the 
principle of effectiveness in EU law.120 Furthermore, the French approach is 
in contrast to the Commission’s Proposal for Directive, wherein the burden 
of proof is placed on the defendant (the Proposal for Directive will be 
further discussed in section 5.4).121  
                                                
117 See the France Commercial Court of Nanterre 11 May 2006 No RG 2004F02643 
Arkopharma v. Roche et Hoffman (La Roche). 
118 Court of Cassation 15 June 2010 No 09-15.816 Doux Aliments v. Ajinomoto Eurolysine.  
119 Vande Walle (2013), pp. 175-176. See also the La Roche case.  
120 See Vande Walle (2013), p. 176 and Komninos (2012). 
121 The Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report (2013), p. 213. 
See also the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 
404 final, 11.6.2013. According to Article 12.1 in the Proposed Directive the ”burden of 
proving that the overcharge was passed on shall rest with the defendant”.     
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4 The Passing-on-defence 
under US Law 
The issue of passing-on-defence was introduced into US law several 
decades ago and is nowadays a well established principle in US federal 
antitrust law. The defence was applied for the first time in 1968 and ten 
years later the indirect purchaser standing was introduced. Both the passing-
on-defence and the standing of indirect purchasers have caused a great 
debate in the US and the law has been queried insofar that several states 
have adopted a different approach regarding these issues.          
4.1 A Brief Introduction to US Antitrust 
Law  
The US is a federal state and the Constitution of the United States 
established the federal system (the federalism). Under federalism, the 
system of government is divided between the federal government and the 
state and local governments. US states are sovereign in all areas that have 
not been assigned as a matter of federal law in the Constitution. In a 
landmark court decision from 1824 the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that the power to “regulate commerce” was granted the Congress and 
that the federal law is given precedence over state laws.122 The antitrust law 
is subject to federal government in the US, however the states have 
subsidiary authority in the area.123  
 
When the European Community adopted the Treaty of Rome in 1957 this 
was seven decades after the birth of the US antitrust law. The Sherman Act 
was passed by the US Congress in 1890 as the first federal antitrust law. 
Today there are three major federal antitrust laws: the Sherman Act124, the 
Clayton Act125 and the Federal Trade Commission Act126.  
 
Although antitrust law is a matter for the federal government in the US, the 
states may, based on their subsidiary authority, grant more far-reaching 
rights than the federal law as long as the law of the states does not infringe 
the federal rights. Consequently, the antitrust state law varies from one state 
                                                
122 The Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1 1894.  
123 Bogdan (2003), p. 129.  
124 The Act prohibits anti-competitive businesses such as anti-competitive agreements and 
other collusive practices. Further, it prohibits the creation of a monopoly under certain 
circumstances and restricts the abuse of a monopoly power. The Act includes criminal 
penalties for some breach of competition law.   
125 The Act is a merger regulation and prohibits merger or acquisitions which are likely to 
restrict competition.  
126 The Act prohibits unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce.   
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to another.127 However, in accordance with the preemption doctrine, federal 
law preempts state law if the state law conflicts with the federal law.128  
 
The US antitrust law has had great influence on the competition thinking in 
Europe, however some features of US antitrust law differ from its European 
counterpart.129 One major difference is that the US antitrust law is enforced 
by a significant amount of private litigation and the antitrust system in the 
US has therefore mainly developed on a case-by-case basis by the courts.130 
Also public parties enforce the US antitrust law however private litigants 
suing for damages for violation of the antitrust law is the driving force.131 
Under the public enforcement of the Sherman Act, individuals or businesses 
can be prosecuted by the Department of Justice. The Sherman Act imposes 
criminal penalties of up to $1,000,000 for individuals along with maximum 
10 years in prison, and up to $100,000,000 for a corporation.132 As in 
regards to the civil actions, successful claimants in an action for damages 
based on US antitrust law are automatically rewarded threefold the amount 
of their injury in compensation (“treble damages”).133 This rule serves to 
deter from anti-competitive conduct and to ensure that victims obtain full 
compensation.134 
4.2 The Passing-on-defence under US 
Law 
The passing-on-defence is not accepted under US federal antitrust law and 
neither is the standing of indirect purchasers. The rejecting of indirect 
purchaser standing is a direct consequent of the denying of the passing-on-
defence since the indirect purchasers base their claim on the fact that an 
overcharge was passed on to them.135 Hence, allowing indirect purchaser 
standing would risk multiple liability and multiple compensation for the 
same act and damage, while it would not be possible for the defendant to 
rely on the fact that the damage may have been passed on.136 The US 
                                                
127 See the United States Department of Justice website 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/antitrust-laws.html, available at 6.11.2013.    
128 Article VI of the US Constitution dictates that the federal law is the ”suprems law of the 
land”.  
129 Jones (1999), pp. 23-24 and Jones and Sufrin (2011), p. 19. 
130 Jones and Suffrin (2011), p. 19. 
131 See the website of the Washington State Office of the Attorney General Guide to 
Antitrust Law, available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/antitrustguide.aspx#.UqCCsCilDZ0, 
5.12.2013.    
132 See the website of the US Federal Trade Commission, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws, 
9.12.2013.   
133 The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, p. 265.  
134 The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, p. 246. In 
Europe, only single damages are awarded however the European Commission in the Green 
Paper considered introducing double damages for horizontal cartels, see section 2.7 above.      
135 See Komninos (2011), p. 456. 
136 Ibid.  
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approach has evolved through case law and the federal US antitrust law 
primarily consists of three judgments regarding the subject.137 
4.2.1 The Hanover Shoe case 
In the Hanover Shoe case138, the Supreme Court of United States embodied 
the principle that the passing-on-defence is generally unavailable to 
defendants in private damages actions brought under federal US antitrust 
law. In the case, Hanover Shoe sued United Shoe for tremble damages on 
the ground that United Shoes tried to monopolize the shoe machinery 
industry in violation with the Sherman Act.      
 
In the judgement, the Supreme Court held that the passing-on-defence 
cannot generally be invoked by price-fixers when sued by a direct 
purchaser. According to the Court, a defendant can only establish a passing-
on-defence if three circumstances can be proved. Firstly, it must be proved 
that the buyer raised its prices as a response to the overcharge, second, that 
the buyer thereafter did not lose sales of profit margin and, thirdly, that the 
buyer would not have raised its prices absent the overcharge. The Court 
further held that the burden to prove these three circumstances would 
ordinarily be insurmountable without a so-called “cost-plus”139 contract or 
any other circumstances that would facilitate proving that the buyer was not 
injured.140  
 
According to the Supreme Court, a direct purchaser does always suffer a 
loss due to an illegal overcharge. As a response to the overcharge, the direct 
purchaser may (1) absorb the cost of the overcharge, (2) raise the prices as a 
consequence of the overcharge and thereby lose sales volume, or (3) suffer a 
loss of profit margin for inelastic goods.141 Furthermore, the Court was not 
impressed with the United Shoe’s argument that the “sound law of 
economics”142 required recognition of the passing-on-defence and the Court 
emphasised that the pricing policy of companies is affected by several 
factors. Regarding the indirect purchasers the Court held that if the passing-
on-defence is approved, both direct and indirect purchasers may have to face 
the argument that they have passed on the overcharge to their customers, 
ultimately to the final consumer. These final consumers usually have a tiny 
stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action. 
Consequently, the treble damages actions were considered to be 
substantially reduced in effectiveness if allowing a passing-on-defence and 
the infringers of the antitrust law would escape damages claims since no one 
would bring a suit against them.143  
                                                
137 The Hanover Shoe case, the Illinois Brick case and the ARC America case. All cases are 
further discussed below.  
138 Case Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery 392 U.S. 481 (1968).  
139 A ”cost-plus” contract is a pre-existing contract between the seller and the purchaser 
with a fixed markup and fixed quantity to be delivered. 
140 Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery, pp. 489-494. 
141 Ibid., pp. 493 and 495. 
142 Ibid., pp. 492-493. 
143 Ibid., p. 494.  
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4.2.2 The Illinois Brick case  
In subsequent case Illinois Brick Co v. Illinois144 the Supreme Court ruled 
that the indirect purchaser standing is denied under US federal antitrust law. 
Indirect purchasers can therefore not, under federal antitrust law, claim 
damages on the basis that an overcharge has been passed on to them. The 
Court justified the denial of indirect purchaser standing by three main 
arguments. First, the Court held that allowing an offensive use145 of passing-
on-defence but not a defensive use146 would create a risk of multiple 
damages. Secondly, one problem in allowing the defence is the difficulty to 
prove whether and how much an overcharged input affects the price of a 
product further down the distribution chain. This may be even more 
problematic if the overcharged input is incorporated in another product. The 
Court stressed that (as held in the Hanover Shoe case) owing the difficulties 
in evidence, the effective enforcement of antitrust laws would be put at risk 
if the defence were allowed.147 Thirdly, the Court considered that the direct 
purchasers are better enforcers than the indirect ones. According to the 
Court, “the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating 
the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers, rather than by 
allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only 
for the amount it could show was absorbed by it”.148  
 
According to the Supreme Court, there were only two alternatives on how to 
address the issue in the case: overrule the Hanover Shoe case (or at least 
limit its scope), or preclude indirect purchases to recover on the pass on 
theory. The Court chose the latter one and since, indirect purchaser standing 
is denied under US federal antitrust law.149     
4.2.3 The Arguments of the Illinois Brick case  
One of the arguments in the Illinois Brick case is that the direct purchasers 
are better enforces of antitrust law than the indirect purchasers.150 It has 
been argued that the enforcement of direct purchasers better serves the two 
objectives of antitrust enforcement: compensation of victims of antitrust 
infringements and deterring of future infringements. These objectives may 
conflict with each other, however the deterring objective is to prefer. Hence, 
especially from a deterrence viewpoint, it has been argued that only the 
direct purchasers should be entitled to sue for damages.151 However, these 
                                                
144 Illinois Brick Co v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
145 The standing of indirect purchasers is sometimes referred to as the “offensive passing-
on”. 
146 The defendants invoking of the passing-on-defence is sometimes referred to as the 
”defensive passing-on”.     
147 Illinois Brick Co v. Illinois, p. 741. 
148 Ibid., p. 735. 
149 Ibid., p. 736. 
150 Ibid., p. 735.  
151 Landes and Posner (University of Chicago Law Review 1979), p. 605 and Petrucci 
(2008), p. 36. See also Landes and Posner (University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1979). 
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arguments have been questioned by Professors Robert Harris152 and 
Lawrence Sullivan153 who are of the opposite opinion. According to the 
Professors, the Congress should overrule the Illinois Brick case since it 
disserves the antitrust enforcement.154 Also the Court itself in the Illinois 
Brick case pointed that direct purchasers might refrain from bringing 
proceedings since such damages action may disrupt their business 
relationship with the suppliers.155 Another issue, delivered by Herbert 
Hovenkamp156, is that the direct purchasers do not in every case have an 
intention to sue for damages. If the overcharge is passed on, no damage has 
been suffered and hence there is no incentive to sue.157 It has also been held 
that there is no empirical evidence supporting that direct purchasers are 
more likely to sue than the indirect ones.158 Altogether, it can be concluded 
that the argument of the effectiveness of direct purchasers’ enforcement of 
the antitrust laws is a controversial one.159 In recent years it has been held 
that even though it is likely that litigation by direct purchasers provide more 
effective deterrence than litigation by indirect purchasers, the latter may 
supplement that deterrence.160  
 
Another argument supporting that direct purchasers are the most effective 
ones is that the enforcement costs and information costs of identifying and 
suing the infringer are lower for the direct purchasers than the indirect. This 
argument in the Illinois Brick case refers to the difficulties in proving the 
effects and dynamics of the overcharge passed on. It has been argued that it 
is difficult and costly to determine the amount of the damage that has been 
passed on. Professors William M. Landes161 and Richard A. Posner162 
defends the denial of indirect purchaser standing and argue that indirect 
purchasers are indirectly compensated since the direct purchasers will 
charge their customers less if the direct purchasers have a right of action for 
damages. Consequently, they consider that a standing for indirect purchasers 
is unnecessary.163  
 
A different opinion is held by Harris and Sullivan, who argues that it is not 
that difficult to determine the amount that has been passed on. They are of 
the opinion that elasticities of the supply are very high in the long run and 
therefore the whole of the overcharge will be passed on. Furthermore, as 
regards the determining of the overcharge effects, the reply has been that all 
                                                
152 Professor Emeritus at Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley. 
153 Former Professor Emeritus at Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles.  
154 Harris and Sullivan (1979). 
155 See the Illinois Brick case, p. 746. The Court was however of the opinion that the 
indirect purchases are the better enforces regardless of this argument. See also the more 
recent article by Cengiz (2007), p. 12. 
156 Professor of Law at University of Iowa.  
157 Hovenkamp (1990), p. 1727. 
158 Harris and Sullivan (1979).  
159 Petrucci (2008), p. 36. 
160 The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, p. 273.  
161 Professor Emeritus of Law and Economics at University of Chicago Law School. 
162 Senior Lecturer in Law at University of Chicago Law School.  
163 Landes and Posner (University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1979), pp. 1274-1276. See 
also Landes and Posner (University of Chicago Law Review 1979).  
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antitrust findings are based on estimates of market conduct and prices and 
such an analysis is always complicated. The analysis is therefore neither 
more, nor less complicated as regards the passing-on-defence.164 This 
argument was raised already in the Illinois Brick case wherein the dissenters 
were not convinced that the complexity in assessing and allocating damages 
in a passing-on case was of greater complexity than other antitrust issues.165 
Furthermore, Harris and Sullivan do not agree that indirect purchasers are 
indirectly compensated since it is unlikely that a damage reward or an 
expected value of such award will have any effect of the price charged by 
the direct purchasers.166 
 
Another argument justifying denial of indirect purchaser standing in the 
Illinois Brick case is the risk multiple liability.167 Multiple liability refers to 
the situation where the infringer, for the same infringement and the same 
harm caused, is liable for damages to both the direct and the indirect 
purchaser. This situation arise since the defendant may not limit his or her 
liability by invoking that the direct purchaser mitigated the loss he or she 
suffered by passing-on the overcharge further down the distribution chain. 
In the dissenting opinion held by Brennan J. in the case, this risk may 
however be avoided by procedural mechanisms, such as res judicata and 
other means which allows a judge to allocate the damage between the 
different purchasers in the same proceedings.168 The issue of multiple 
liability may also be interpreted in a different way. The second meaning of 
multiple liability and damages refers to the situation when the harm is two-
fold: direct purchasers may have suffered a loss in sales because of the 
higher prices to their customers and the indirect purchasers suffer a loss 
because of this overcharge. In such a case, both parties have suffered harm 
and there is no reason to deny either of them full compensation. The real 
problem is rather to quantify the harm suffered.169 The argument of multiple 
liability as regards the passing-on-defence will be further discussed below.   
4.2.4 State Law on Passing-on-defence and 
Standing of Indirect Purchasers 
The judgements of the Hanover Shoe case and the Illinois Brick case caused 
an intense debate regarding the antitrust policy within the US. As a response 
to the ruling in the Illinois Brick case, several states adopted so-called 
Illinois Brick repealer statues.170 The inherent conflict between the statues 
and the federal law raised issues of federalism and the application of the 
preemption doctrine. When applying the preemption doctrine, there is a 
presumption against preemption in areas traditionally regulated under state 
                                                
164 Petrucci (2008), p. 39.  
165 See the Illinois Brick case, pp. 758-760 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
166 Harris and Sullivan (1979), pp. 299-301.  
167 See the Illinois Brick case, p. 720. 
168 Ibid., p. 762.  
169 Petrucci (2008), pp. 36-37.  
170 Cengiz (2007), p. 19.  
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law.171 Eventually, the Supreme Court in the ARC America case172 clarified 
that the repealer statues of the Illinois Brick case were valid, inter alia, since 
the existence of a strong tradition of antitrust regulation at state level. The 
ruling of the Supreme Court implies that states may enact legislation 
allowing the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing although 
denied under federal law.173 Consequently, several states in the US 
recognise indirect purchaser standing.  
 
One state adopting a repealer statue as a response to the Illinois Brick case 
was California. The state law of California hence allows standing of indirect 
purchasers. In a recent case from California Supreme Court, retail 
pharmacies sued drug manufactures for damages on the ground that the 
manufactures had fixed their prices on drugs in the US and thereby violated 
the Cartwright Act174. As a defence, the manufactures claimed that the 
pharmacies had not suffered any loss since they had passed on any alleged 
overcharge to their customers. The question of the case was therefore if also 
the passing-on-defence was permitted under the Cartwright Act. According 
to the Court, most indicated that the Legislature would prefer the adoption 
of the principle set in the Hanover Shoe case. Moreover it was held that an 
acceptance of the passing-on-defence would impede the antitrust 
enforcement and reduce incentives to sue for damages. The Court therefore 
ruled that the passing-on-defence is not available under California law.175  
 
Since California law allows damages actions by indirect purchasers, an 
application of the rule stated in the Hanover Shoe case may give rise to 
prospect of duplicative recovery. In order to avoid such multiple recoveries, 
the Court held that when multiple levels of purchasers sue for damages and 
the damages must be allocated among the various levels of injured 
purchasers, the defendant may assert a pass on defence as needed to avoid 
duplication in the recovery of damages.176  
4.3 Aspects on the US Law 
Clearly, the US law favours the direct purchasers and their right to 
compensation.177 The solution chosen in US federal antitrust law to leave 
consumers and other indirect purchasers without a possibility to recover 
damages for any harm suffered has been heavily criticised in the US. It has 
been held that the decision in the Illinois Brick case ignores the will of the 
Congress and bills in order to overrule the decision by federal statue have 
                                                
171 Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories Inc 471 U.S. 707 (1985) and 
Cengiz (2007), p. 20. 
172 California v. ARC America Corp 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
173 See case California v. ARC America Corp 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
174 The Cartwright Act is the primary California state antitrust law.  
175 Clayworth v. Pfizer No S166435 Cal. 4th, 2010 WL 2721021, 12 July 2010. 
176 Ibid., p. 37. For a further discussion about the case, see Nguyen, Sasse, McNary and 
Solh (2010). See also Lawfirm Sidley: California Litigation Update (2010), Shohet (2010) 
and Foley and Taggart (2011). All available at websites (see the bibliography below).  
177 Illinois Brick Co v. Illinois, p. 735. See also Komninos (2011), p. 456. 
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been introduced. The bills and other incentives have however not been 
successful and the Illinois Brick case is still US law (however many states 
allows indirect purchaser standing).178 The most fundamental critic against 
the case is that if fails to compensate the real victims of antitrust 
violation.179  
 
However, as stated above, the US states may adopt state law recognising the 
passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing. Since the widespread 
criticism of the judgement in the Illinois Brick case several states have 
chosen a different approach regarding the standing of indirect purchasers.180 
Many states allow direct, as well as indirect, purchasers to sue for damages 
under the state antitrust law.181 As a consequence, direct purchasers often 
sue for damages in federal court and indirect purchasers often sue for 
damages in state court in order to recover compensation from the same 
antitrust infringement.182 The private enforcement in the US has been 
described as a chaotic environment as regards the coexisting of the passing-
on-defence and the standing of indirect purchasers. Not only does the 
federal law and state law differ, the standards of the different states varies as 
well.183    
 
According to Landes and Posner the finding of the Court in the Illinois 
Brick case was necessary if the ruling in the Hanover Shoe case should be 
respected. The Court could not allow standing of the indirect purchasers 
without also allowing the defendants use of the passing-on-defence unless 
they were willing to accept multiple liability for the defendant. There are, 
Landes and Posner argues, only two possibilities in avoiding multiple 
damages. One is to overrule the Hanover Shoe case and allow the indirect 
purchasers to sue. The other is to preclude the indirect purchasers from 
suing and retain the rule established in the Hanover Shoe case. The Illinois 
Brick case is therefore to be seen as the mirror image of the Hanover Shoe 
case.184  
 
As a consequence of the judgements in the Hanover Shoe case and the 
Illinois Brick case the direct purchasers may sue for the entire overcharge 
even if the cost is passed on to their customers. The direct purchasers may 
therefore obtain damages despite that no harm has been suffered. This 
situation is often referred to as the unjust enrichment of the direct purchaser 
                                                
178 The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, pp. 268-269.  
179 Cavanagh (2004), pp. 23-24 and Gavil (2005), p. 565. 
180 See inter alia Strand (2010), pp. 9-10 and Petrucci (2008), p. 35.    
181 An Antitrust Modernization Commission was created in the US in order to examine if 
there is a need to modernise the US antitrust laws. In April 2007 the Commission presented 
their report and recommendations. According to the report, more than thirty-five states 
permit both indirect and direct purchasers to sue for damages under state law, see p. 269. 
The report in available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf, 
7.11.2013.   
182 The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, p. 266. 
183 Cengiz (2007), p. 21. 
184 Landes and Posner (University of Chicago Law Review 1979), p. 603.  
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and will be further discussed in section 5.3.2.1 of this thesis. Since the 
ruling in the Illinois Shoe case it is clear that indirect purchasers are denied 
standing under US federal law. The denial of indirect purchaser standing is a 
direct consequence of the denial of the passing-on-defence – if defendants 
cannot claim that an overcharge is passed on, indirect purchasers likewise 
cannot claim a pass on ground for injury resulting from their purchase of an 
overcharged product because of an antitrust violation. In the ruling of the 
Court in the Illinois Shoe case it was held that this eliminates the risk of 
multiple liability. The validity of this argument will be discussed in section 
5.3.2.2 of this thesis.   
4.4 The Antitrust Modernization 
Commission in the US 
In 2007, an Antitrust Modernization Commission published their Report and 
Recommendations for the future US antitrust law. The Report observes that 
several states have adopted legislation or case-law allowing both direct and 
indirect purchasers to sue for damages. As a result, direct and indirect 
purchasers frequently bring multiple and duplicative lawsuits in both federal 
courts and state courts. According to the Report, the duplicate and parallel 
lawsuits from the multiple proceedings concerning the same antitrust 
violation are very wasteful and impose a burden on both the judicial system 
and the parties. The conflict between federal antitrust law and state law has 
also entailed inconsistent recoveries and the risk of duplicative liability has 
increased. Furthermore, the conflict and inconsistency in law makes it 
difficult to achieve settlements, both between the parties and global.185  
 
In order to achieve the best solution for the antitrust law in the US, the 
Report emphasises that the litigation by direct and indirect purchasers must 
become more effective and fair. Furthermore, the litigation should not result 
in duplicative liability or denial of compensation to persons who suffered 
harm. According to the Report, the litigation would have better prospects 
attain these goals if all direct and indirect purchasers were allowed to 
recover their actual damages under federal law. In addition, all claim arising 
from the same alleged antitrust infringement should be heard in one federal 
court.186 To achieve this, the Antitrust Commission recommends the 
Congress to overrule the Hanover Shoe case and the Illinois Brick case.187  
                                                
185 The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, pp. 266 and 
271. 
186 Ibid., p. 275.  
187 Ibid., pp. 267 and 275. 
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5 The EU Solution on the 
Passing-on-defence 
5.1 A Brief Introduction 
The EU law does not provide legislation regarding the matter of passing-on-
defence and indirect purchaser standing. However, as discussed above, some 
Member States have dealt with the issue within their national law.188 Hence, 
in absence of EU legislation it has been for the domestic law of each 
Member State to address the issue as long as the EU principles established 
by the CJEU is respected.189 As described above, the Commission 
introduced a Green Paper in 2005 in order to facilitate private litigation in 
competition cases in Europe. In the Paper, different solutions regarding the 
application of the passing-on-defence were discussed. In 2006 the CJEU 
delivered its ruling in the Manfredi case holding that any individual has a 
right to compensation under EU law. For reasons further explained below, it 
has been held that the only possibility for the Commission after the 
Manfredi ruling was the solution now chosen in the Proposed Directive.        
5.2 The Passing-on-defence in the Green 
Paper 
The Green Paper presented four options on how to handle the passing-on-
defence and indirect purchaser standing. In summary, the Paper held that an 
application of the passing-on-defence is very complex and the analysis of its 
effects becomes even more difficult further down in the distribution chain. 
An allowance of the defence may also create conflicts between claimants at 
different levels of the distribution chain.190 The Paper noticed that the CJEU 
had never closer analysed the passing-on-defence in its judgments. 
However, in the Courage case the Court stated that Community law does 
not prevent Member States from taking measures ensuring that the rights 
granted by Community law does not entail an unjust enrichment for the 
                                                
188 The issues have occurred in several Member States. The Polish law, for example, does 
not acknowledge the passing-on-defence or the notion of an ”indirect purhaser”, see Blanke 
and Nazzini (2012), pp. 567-615. In Hungaria, the Metropolitan Court of Appeal in 2012 
ruled that the passing-on-defence is available under Hungarian law. See Ritter (2012) and 
case in Metropolitan Court of Appeal in Hungaria Case n° 14.Gf.40.521/2011/9, 14 March 
2012. 
189 In the Courage case the CJEU stated that ”in absence of Community rules governing the 
matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and 
tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing 
actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from Community law” in 
accordance with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, at para. 29.  
190 The Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Green Paper (2005), para. 159. 
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individuals enjoying them.191 In the ruling the Court referred to its previous 
case law wherein the passing-on-defence has been acknowledged in other 
fields of EU law.192 The Commission however noticed that the case law of 
CJEU is limited to holding that EU law does not prevent national law that 
prohibits unjust enrichment. Thus, the case law of CJEU does not establish 
the existence of the passing-on-defence as a matter of EU law.193 
 
The Paper stressed that the primary basis for the existence of a passing-on-
defence is the prevention of an unjust enrichment of the claimant.194 The 
Paper however pointed out that a passing-on of an overcharge does not 
necessarily entail an unjust enrichment of the claimant (the direct purchaser) 
since it may as well result in a reduced sale for the claimant as he or she has 
to raise the prices. Hence, a presumption that passing-on leads to an unjust 
enrichment would risk offending the EU principle of effectiveness.195 The 
Paper concluded that there is no passing-on-defence in EU law, however 
there is an unjust enrichment defence which requires proof of passing-on 
and proof of no reduction in sales or other reduction in income.196 
Furthermore, the Commission emphasised that the existence of a passing-
on-defence complicates and increases the complexity of damages claims and 
constitutes obstacles to private actions. It is argued that it would be 
significantly difficult to allocate and quantify damages between different 
claimants at different levels of the distribution chain if a passing-on-defence 
was recognised under EU law.197 One problem with the defence is the 
difficulties of proof in proving a causal relationship between the harm 
caused by the infringement of competition law and the extent of the 
damages the indirect customer suffers.198 In the annex to the Green Paper 
the Commission stated; “a combination of the possibility for the defendant 
to rely on the passing on defence with the indirect purchaser actions would 
seriously restrict private actions”.199 
 
Regarding indirect purchaser standing, the Green Paper stressed that the 
CJEU has not taken any position on this matter however it has been argued 
that the Courage case entails that such a standing cannot be denied under 
EU law. According to the Paper there is much to suggest that both direct and 
indirect purchasers should have the right to claim damages, since a different 
solution would deprive those most likely to have suffered harm a remedy. 
                                                
191 In the Courage case, at para. 30, the Court held that “Community law does not prevent 
national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by 
the Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them”. The 
Court repeated this statement in subsequent Manfredi case (at para. 94). 
192 The defence has been accepted under EU law in actions for the non-contractual liability 
of the Community and for the recovery of illegal charges levied by a Member State in 
breach of EU law, see the Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Green Paper 
(2005), paras. 164 and 165. 
193 See the Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Green Paper (2005), para. 168. 
194 Ibid., para. 169. 
195 Ibid., paras. 169 and 172. 
196 Ibid., para. 173. 
197 Ibid., para. 174.  
198 The Green Paper (2005), pp. 7-8. 
199 The Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Green Paper (2005), p. 13. 
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However, the Paper also stressed that such a solution would create 
complexities, disincentives and higher transaction costs. Thus it is 
emphasised that in designing a system of private litigation based on 
competition law the main objective must be to obtain an efficient system 
and an effective enforcement of the competition rules. In an ideal world, 
such a system would be able to achieve both the objectives of deterrence 
and compensation to some degree. If such a system can be found, the 
Commission found no reason for why not even the indirect purchasers 
should be able to claim damages in antitrust cases. It is however, according 
to the Commission, likely that a trade-off between the interest of full 
recovery for those who have suffered harm because of a violation of 
competition law and efficiency is inevitable.200  
 
Based on these arguments the Commission suggested that the determining 
factor should be the effective enforcement of EU law.201 A limitation of 
rights conferred upon some individuals should be accepted if such limitation 
is necessary to ensure an effective system of safeguarding the enforcement 
of Articles 101 and 102. Rather than providing absolute protection of all 
rights it may therefore be necessary to decide which rights to favour in order 
to ensure an effective enforcement system of competition law.202  
5.3 The Passing-on-defence in the White 
Paper  
After the publication of the Green Paper the CJEU delivered its ruling in the 
Manfredi case. As explained above, the case provides any individual to 
claim compensation based on a violation of EU competition law.  
 
In light of the Court’s ruling in the Manfredi case wherein the compensatory 
principle and the availability of damages for all persons suffered harm were 
emphasised, the White Paper suggests that the passing-on-defence should be 
recognised under EU law. It is held in the Paper that denial of such defence 
can result in an unjust enrichment of claimants who have passed on an 
illegal overcharge. A defendant should therefore be able to rely on the 
defence against a claim for compensation, brought by a claimant who is not 
a final customer.203 The burden of proving that such overcharge has passed 
on shall rest with the defendant. According to the Paper, the standard of 
proving that a passing-on has occurred should not be lower than the 
standard to which the claimant has to prove his or her damage.204 
 
                                                
200 See the Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Green Paper (2005), paras. 177-
180. 
201 Ibid., para. 180. 
202 Ibid., para. 180. 
203 The Commission Staff Working Paper (2008), paras. 208-214. See also the White Paper 
(2008), pp. 7-8.  
204 The Commission Staff Working Paper (2008), paras. 208-214. 
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The passing-on-defence can also be invoked by an indirect purchaser in 
order to show harm suffered.205 Due to these indirect purchasers distance 
from the infringement, it has often been proven difficult to show that an 
overcharge has been passed on to the indirect purchasers through the 
distribution chain and that they have suffered harm. Therefore, in the Paper 
the Commission proposes that these indirect purchasers should be able to 
rely on a rebuttable presumption that the illegal overcharge was passed on to 
them in its entirely.206   
 
In the public consultation of the Green Paper the respondents were of 
divergent views whether or not to allow the defence. The majority however 
were of the opinion that any unjust enrichment must be avoided (both for 
claimants and defendants). If prohibiting the passing-on-defence, direct 
purchasers may be awarded damages for harm that has not been suffered 
since the overcharge was passed on. In addition, the defendant risk paying 
damages also to the purchasers downstream the direct purchaser, if the 
former can show that harm has been suffered. In such cases, the liability of 
the defendant would lead to multiple recoveries. Several responders to the 
consultation of the Green Paper however consider such scenario to be highly 
theoretical and argued that recognition of the defence entails that direct 
purchasers are less likely to initiate an action for damages. Besides, it is 
more difficult for the indirect purchasers to prove the infringement and the 
harm it has caused and the defence may therefore lead to none being 
compensated at all.207  
 
One of the main proposals in the White Paper is the broad rule of standing 
to sue for damages. The right to damages is recognised for all individuals 
harmed by an infringement of EU competition law. The proposal thereby 
entails that both direct and indirect purchasers and consumers can sue for 
damages based on competition law.208 According to the Commission, the 
reference by the CJEU in the Manfredi case to any individual includes even 
indirect purchasers.209  
 
A consequence of recognising the indirect purchaser standing is that 
purchasers at different levels in the distribution chain may claim damages 
based on the same infringement of competition law. If the defendant in such 
case fails in proving that an overcharge has been passed on, the court may 
                                                
205 In the White Paper the Commission, as a metaphor, refers to the defendants invoking of 
the passing-on-defence as a shield in order to mitigate or escape a damages claim and a 
claimant other that the direct purchasers relying on the defence of overcharges as a sword in 
order to substantiate his damages claim against the defendant.      
206 The Commission Staff Working Paper (2008), paras. 215-220. See also the White Paper 
(2008), p. 8. 
207 See the Commission Staff Working Paper (2008), paras. 203-204.  
208 Ibid., paras. 24-37.  
209 Ibid., para. 37. In the Manfredi case, the CJEU stated that “it follows that any individual 
can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between 
the harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC”, at para. 61. Even 
in the Courage case the CJEU stated that the possibility to claim damages should be open 
to any individual, at para. 26. 
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award the direct purchaser full compensation. However, if the defendant in a 
second litigation by the indirect purchasers fails to rebut the presumption 
that the illegal overcharge was passed on, also the indirect purchasers will 
be awarded full compensation. The defendant will then face multiple 
liability for the same overcharge. Contrary, if the defendant successfully 
invokes the passing-on-defence and rebuts the presumption invoked by the 
indirect purchaser, the infringer does not have to compensate anyone. To 
avoid such overcompensation or undercompensation, the Commission 
encourages the national courts to use all available mechanisms under 
national law and EU law.210 Regarding the standing of indirect purchasers 
and damages based on EU competition law, the Commission states in the 
Staff Working Paper, annexed to the White Paper, that: 
 
“The Commission […] does not intend to suggest any limitation on standing 
of anyone who can show a causal link between his harm and an 
infringement of Article 101 or 102”.211    
 
Furthermore, the Commission holds that:  
 
“Any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there 
is a causal relationship between that harm and an infringement of Article 
[101] and [102]. This principle also applies to indirect purchasers.”212 
 
Another important proposal as in regards to the exercise of passing-on-
defence is the possibility to collective redress.213 This subject is outside the 
scope of this thesis, however it is an important reform in relation to the 
indirect purchaser standing. Indirect purchasers are often small businesses 
and/or individual consumers whom suffer relatively small losses because of 
an infringement of competition law. These victims are also often deterred 
from bringing proceedings of damages as an individual claim because of the 
high costs, risks and uncertainties involved in such proceedings, etc. As a 
result, many victims of antitrust infringement remain uncompensated.214 
Furthermore, it has been held that the absence of mechanisms for collective 
claims in Europe has been one of the main reasons for the poor development 
of private antitrust enforcement.215 The White Paper proposes two 
complementary mechanisms of collective redress: representative redress and 
collective actions.216 Representative redress is brought by qualified entities, 
such as consumer associations and trade associations, on behalf of 
identified, or sometimes unidentified, victims. In collective actions victims 
expressly decide to combine their individual claims into one single action.217  
The so-called collective redress is considered to improve the possibility for 
                                                
210 The White Paper (2008), p. 8. See also the Commission Staff Working Paper (2008), 
paras. 221-225. 
211 The Commission Staff Working Paper (2008), para. 37.  
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victims of antitrust infringement to obtain effective compensation.218 In 
2011 a public consultation regarding a coherent European approach to 
collective redress was completed.219  
5.3.1 Comments on the White Paper  
The White Paper generated a broad debate among stakeholders and several 
comments were submitted to the Commission. Overall, the stakeholders 
welcomed the Commission’s endeavours in enabling antitrust damages 
actions. However, there were different opinions regarding the best measures 
to achieve this aim.220 Regarding the subject of this thesis, the main 
comments are presented below.  
 
The proposal of indirect purchaser standing did not give rise to many 
comments. Only eight of the commentators suggested a limitation of the 
standing of indirect purchasers.221 As explained above, it has been held that 
the CJEU’s ruling in the Manfredi case implies that no limitation of indirect 
purchaser standing in competition damages cases is possible under EU law. 
Some commentators however questioned the broad rule of standing 
advocated in the White Paper. These commentators held that it does not 
follow from the Courage and Manfredi cases that a particular group of 
claimants should be favoured in the private litigation of damage claims. 
Instead, the commentators considered it a question of evidence and 
causation. Hence, it would be more effective to introduce a procedure in 
national courts allowing all those harmed by the same competition 
infringement to bring claims. The claimants should then be compensated to 
the extent that they can prove their individual loss caused by the 
competition infringement (the causal relationship).222      
 
The implementation of the passing-on-defence was generally supported by 
the commentators in the consultation of the White Paper.223 One aspect 
addressed by consumer associations and other non-business responders was 
that the burden of proving that an overcharge has passed on should benefit 
the victims. A different solution was considered to make it possible for the 
infringer to take advantage of his or her illegal behaviour and retain the 
illegal overcharge. However, businesses and businesses associations 
                                                
218 Press release MEMO/13/531, 11.6.2013.   
219 Public consultation Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html, 
17.12.2013.   
220 See the Proposal for Directive, p. 7.  
221 See the Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report (2013), p. 56 
at para. 155.     
222 See the comments of UK lawfirm Addleshaw Goddard Respons. See also the comments 
of the Association of European Competition Law Judges who considers that the indirect 
purchasers establishment of a passing-on of an overcharge is part of the general 
requirement of showing and proving a causal link between the infringement and the loss 
suffered.      
223 The Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report (2013), p. 56 at 
para. 157 and p. 87.  
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questioned such facilitation in the burden of proof for the claimants because 
of the risk of multiple damages.224 Several commentators observed the risk 
that the defendant will be subject to double liability since he or she may not 
be able to prove that a direct purchaser has passed on an overcharge, and 
neither is able to disprove passing-on downstream the distribution chain in a 
claim by an indirect purchaser.225 The Commission has stressed that the risk 
of undercompensation to the claimant is considered more important than the 
risk of overcompensation in such situation.226  
 
Moreover, it is held in the comments that the burden of proof upon the 
defendant may give the claimant double benefits. For example, when the 
claimant is both an indirect purchaser and a seller, the claimant would 
benefit of both the presumption that the entire overcharge was passed on to 
him or her, but also benefit from a presumption that the claimant did not 
pass on any of the overcharge to his or her customers. The latter benefit 
occurs since the passing-on-defence is the defendant’s burden to prove.227  
 
In order to avoid the risk of multiple compensation, some commentators 
suggested that a consolidation of cases would be preferable. Such solution 
would enable the direct and indirect purchasers to be heard in the same 
proceedings. Moreover, some commentators proposed that the first claimant 
should be awarded the entire amount of damages and the second claimant 
should thereafter sue the first in order to obtain his share.228     
 
The Commission’s proposal allows the indirect purchasers to rely on the 
rebuttable presumption that the entire overcharge has passed on to them. 
Many businesses and business associations have questioned this proposal 
since it is deemed to expose the defendants of a risk of double or multiple 
damages when both the direct and indirect purchasers claim compensation 
for the same infringement.229 Besides, it is held that it will be difficult in 
practice for the defendant to rebut the presumption.230 Moreover, several 
commentators raise concerns about introducing collective redress into EU 
law. These commentators question if the introduction of such US-style 
system would be for the best interest of the people and consumers in Europe 
and argue that such a system would be open to abuse, as the US example.231  
                                                
224 Ibid., p. 56 at para. 157. 
225 See the joint comments of the American Bar Association section of Antitrust law, 
section of International law and section of Business law, pp. 21-22.    
226 The Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report (2013), p. 56 at 
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5.3.2 Aspects on the Consequences of the 
Passing-on-defence  
Two main arguments are put forward by the Commission for recognising 
the passing-on-defence: claimants should not be unjustly enriched and 
defendants should not be liable for multiple damages.232 These arguments, 
along with the indirect purchaser standing, are discussed below. 
5.3.2.1 Unjust Enrichment   
According to Firat Cengiz233, the matters of unjust enrichment and passing-
on-defence are derived from the fairness element.234 Cengiz argues that a 
denial of the defence may entail that the direct purchaser receives 
compensation exceeding the actual harm suffered while the indirect 
purchasers suffers an “unjust enpoorment” since they are not compensated 
for their loss.235 The justification of the passing-on-defence based on an 
argument of unjust enrichment implies two problems. The first is the one of 
evidence; it is difficult to decide the extent of a claimant’s passing-on of an 
overcharge. According to Magnus Strand236, it cannot be presumed that all 
overcharges are passed on downstream the distribution chain since the 
possibility of including the overcharge in the price depends on the elasticity 
of demand237 on the market. Harris and Sullivan holds the same opinion and 
argues that passing-on of an overcharge to the indirect purchasers depends 
mainly on the elasticities of the demand and supply in the market.238 Only in 
case of zero price elasticity on demand it is possible to pass on the 
overcharge without risking a drop of sale.239 Moreover, it can never be 
guaranteed that a price increase is due to an overcharge since it may be 
caused by other circumstances.240 
 
The second problem is whether or not a grant of damages exceeding the 
injury can be described as an unjust enrichment at all. Strand argues that the 
reluctance to the direct purchasers potential excess in damages implies that 
the infringer is allowed to keep the enrichment he or she gained through the 
infringement of competition law. Thus, the only unjust enrichment in such 
situation is the enrichment of the infringer. Strand is of the opinion that in 
cases where there is a risk that the claimant will obtain overcompensation at 
                                                                                                                        
undermine enforcement by public authorities which is far more effective; could lead to 
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the expense of the infringer, it is preferable to let the infringer bear the risk 
instead of the claimant. Such policy would serve the objective of deterrence 
as well as the objective of full compensation.241 The Commission has taken 
a similar approach and stresses that overcompensation to victims of 
competition infringement is preferable to undercompensation.242 
Accordingly, there is no reason for such hesitation in rewarding the claimant 
compensation that may exceed the injury sustained to some extent.243 
Therefore, Strand argues that the discussion of unjust enrichment should not 
be about the claimant’s enrichment; instead focus should be at preclude the 
infringer to be enriched by his own violation of competition law. In order to 
meet the objective of deterrence the system of private enforcement must 
address this matter since it otherwise may be an incentive to infringe the 
competition law.244 The same opinion is held by Nils Wahl245 who argues 
that such approach would best serve the interest of deterrence and 
efficiency.246Wahl questions why it should be unacceptable to award the 
claimant an unjust enrichment while acceptable to let the same enrichment 
retain with the infringer.247 Wahl argues that overcompensation of the 
claimant to some extent is acceptable since it otherwise would be possible 
for the infringer to benefit from his or her own infringement of competition 
law.248 Furthermore, the allowance of overcompensation must be viewed in 
relation to the investigation costs of allocating the overcharge that has been 
passed on among the different levels of the distribution chain. The argument 
of Wahl is that the passing-on-defence should be denied. This because only 
if the direct purchaser is able to obtain the entire amount of damages for the 
harm suffered, the objective of deterrence is met.249 It must however be 
observed that the opinion of Wahl is held before the CJEU’s judgment in the 
Courage and the Manfredi cases. In contrast to Wahl, Greg Olsen250 argues 
that if the passing-on-defence is excluded the direct purchaser will be 
overcompensated and such approach would be contrary to the UK law.251  
 
It may be argued that a direct purchaser suffers harm at the moment he pays 
an overcharge derived from a violation of competition law and subsequent 
actions in order to mitigate that harm should not be taken into consideration. 
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In this view, the injury occurs already when a buyer pays the overcharge and 
a subsequent compensation for that overcharge does not constitute an unjust 
enrichment of that buyer.252 This was the opinion of the US Supreme Court 
in the Hanover Shoe case. The Court held that a buyer facing an overcharge 
may (1) do nothing and thereby absorb the loss, (2) maintain his or her own 
price but take actions in order to increase the sale volume or to decrease 
other costs, or, (3) raise the price of the product. The Supreme Court held 
that “At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller remains 
illegally high, and his profits would be greater were his costs lower”.253 
Consequently, a buyer under US law is entitled to damages in all these 
situations. 
5.3.2.2 Multiple Damages and Liability 
The second main argument in recognising the passing-on-defence is that 
defendants should not be liable for multiple damages. For reasons described 
above, the avoidance of multiple damages may be accomplished by either 
allowing the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing (as the 
proposed EU solution) or by denying both the defence and the standing of 
indirect purchaser (as in US federal law). According to Strand, it is arguable 
if the solution chosen by the Commission in the White Paper and the 
Proposed Directive is as effective as the US solution in avoiding multiple 
damages. As explained above, there may be situations where the infringer is 
unsuccessful in litigation against both the direct purchaser and the indirect 
purchaser. In such situations full compensation is rewarded to both the 
direct purchaser and to the indirect purchaser. If the aim is to avoid multiple 
damages, the US solution may therefore be preferable to the solution by the 
Commission in the Proposed Directive.254 It has however been held that 
denial of indirect purchaser standing is contrary to the EU law and 
especially the principle of direct effect.255             
 
A different approach to the risk of multiple damages is advocated by Strand, 
who argues that the risk of multiple damages for the defendant should be 
embraced. Strand argues that such embracing approach would benefit the 
objective of deterrence and because of the requirement of causal relationship 
established in the Manfredi case, it is unlikely to create unpredictable 
quantities of claims based on the same violation of competition law.256 
According to Strand, the fear of multiple damages within the EU context is 
not justified as this fear is often based on experiences from the US legal 
system. The US example and caution on multiple damages must be seen in 
context of the automatic awarding of treble damages to all claimants in case 
of multiple liability for a defendant. Olsen is of the same opinion and argues 
that the exclusion of the passing-on-defence in the US law must be 
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understood as a part of a system of treble damages.257 Hence, it has been 
argued that the fear of awarding multiple damages in EU is excessive.258 
 
Professors Theon van Dijk259 and Frank Verboven260 argue that there are 
some practical difficulties in implementing the passing-on-defence. 
Recognition of the passing-on-defence is often said to complicate the 
proceedings of damages claims and discourage such private damages claims 
based on competition law. Further, the passing-on-defence may be seen as 
an advantage of the defendant and a disadvantage for the claimant. The 
passing-on-defence implies that the direct purchaser has less incentive to 
bring a damage claim, however this reduced incentives is not compensated 
by an increased incentive of the indirect purchasers, due to the distance from 
the infringer and access to less information than the direct purchaser.261 
Regarding the risk of multiple liability for the defendants, van Dijk and 
Verboven argues that this risk may serve as a deterrence instrument, 
however it is more desirable to obtain the aim of deterrence by rewarding 
double or treble damages claims.262    
5.3.2.3 The Standing of Indirect Purchasers 
Along with recognising of the passing-on-defence comes the indirect 
purchaser standing. Above shows that admitting such standing is consistent 
with the EU law.263 Petrucci argues that allowing indirect purchasers to sue 
is compatible with the principle of full compensation and compensatory 
justice: the infringer causing harm should give redress to the harmed 
victim.264 Petrucci also argues that allowance of standing for indirect 
purchasers is consistent with the main objective of competition law – 
maximising of consumer welfare – and is thereby important from a policy 
perspective.265 Effective competition litigation will also serve the reputation 
of competition law among the public and deter from involvement in anti-
competitive practices. Further, from a fairness perspective, it is important 
that persons and undertakings that have suffered harm are compensated for 
their losses.266 Some difficulties however arise when allowing indirect 
purchasers to sue for damages. One problem is to decide who is entitled to 
damages. As always, in order to obtain damages one must show that harm 
has occurred. Further, there must be a causal link between the harm suffered 
and the violation of competition law. Another difficulty is to quantify the 
harm suffered, i.e. the amount of the overcharge. This problem increases 
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further down in the distribution chain as a consequence of the increasing 
dilutive effect as the eventual harm suffered by each individual is small. 
Another complexity is that an overcharged product, deriving from an 
infringement of competition law, can be input or/and incorporated to 
another product or service. For obvious reasons this complicates the 
quantification of harm even more.267  
 
There are also procedural aspects linked to the recognising of indirect 
purchaser standing, such as the risk, time and cost of bringing an action for 
damages. Richard Whish268 and David Bailey269 argues that there is a risk 
that no one will bother to sue for damages since the harm suffered by each 
person may be small. Furthermore, Whish and Bailey points out that there is 
a risk that the indirect purchasers neither have knowledge of the 
infringement, the harm suffered or that they are entitled to damages.270 From 
a procedural aspect, the importance of harmonised procedural rules within 
the EU has been emphasised in order to minimise the risk of multiple 
proceedings based on the same violation of competition law.271 
5.4 The Proposal for Directive COM(2013) 
404 
5.4.1 General Introduction to the Proposal for 
Directive COM(2013) 404 
Since the modernisation in 2004, the Commission has repeatedly stated that 
the right to obtain damages for harm suffered due to an antitrust violation is 
one of the main instruments in achieving effective application of the EU 
antitrust law. However, to date very few damages claims are brought before 
the national courts and it is still difficult for individuals to obtain redress.272 
According to the Commission, this is due to shortcomings in the domestic 
legal frameworks of the Member States. Moreover, national rules in the 
Member States are widely diverging, implying varying results for the 
different jurisdictions. As a consequence, emerge of “hot spots” in the EU 
has occurred in countries considered to have more favourable rules, 
especially the UK, Germany and the Netherlands.273  
 
To date, EU law does not provide any statutory rules on the issues of 
passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing. However, in June 2013 
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the Commission issued a proposal for Directive on Antitrust Damages.274 
The Commission’s “package” consists of a Directive, a communication on 
quantifying antitrust harm275 and a recommendation on Collective 
Redress276. The main reason for adopting the package is to remove the 
obstacles that currently inhibit the award of compensation to victims of 
antitrust infringements. A directive is deemed to be the most appropriate 
instrument to remove the hurdles in the national law of the Member States 
since it permits the states to decide how to implement the proposals while 
respecting the legal tradition of each Member State.277  
 
The Proposal for Directive has two main objectives: optimise the interaction 
between the public and the private enforcement and to ensure full 
compensation to victims of competition law infringements.278 In order to 
maintain a genuinely European approach, the central role of the public 
enforcement is emphasised in the Proposed Directive. The Commission 
stresses that it is essential to guarantee effective protection of the public 
enforcement of the EU competition law and to ensure that the Commission 
and the NCA can maintain a policy of strong public enforcement. Further, it 
is held that deterrence is not a primary objective and the Commission seems 
to consider that the role of deterrence of anti-competitive practices should 
primarily rest with the public authorities and not with civil actions, although 
this is not straight expressed.279 The Proposal for Directive also states that 
litigation in national courts should aim at compensation, not in more actions 
or extensive litigation. For this reason, the Commission in the Proposed 
Directive encourage consensual dispute resolution.280   
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Since the Proposal for Directive was recently issued, not much has been 
written regarding it. It has however been held that the proposed measures 
are far-reaching in order to facilitate antitrust damages actions within the 
EU.281 The Proposal for Directive has been submitted to the European 
Parliament and the Council and if adopted, Member States will have to 
implement the provisions of the Proposed Directive within two years.282  
5.4.2 The Proposal for Directive on Passing-on-
defence 
The passing-on-defence is one example of diverging legislation which has 
led to an uneven enforcement in the different Member States regarding 
damages based on competition law. The Manfredi case is codified in Article 
1 of the Proposed Directive and clarifies that anyone who has suffered harm 
because of an infringement of competition law has a right to full 
compensation.283 Articles 12–15284 regulate the passing-on-defence and the 
position of the indirect purchasers.    
 
Article 12 of the Proposal for Directive implements the passing-on-defence 
into EU law. The Article clarifies that the burden of proving that an 
overcharge has been passed on shall rest with the defendant. In accordance 
with Article 12(2) a defendant cannot invoke the defence when the 
overcharge has been passed on to a person for whom it is “legally 
impossible” to claim compensation. Hence, the defence is not absolute but it 
is not defined under which circumstances it is “legally impossible” for a 
person to claim compensation. According to the preamble of the Proposed 
Directive, national rules of causality, including the rules of foreseeability 
and remoteness, may entail that individuals are legally unable to claim 
compensation in a certain case.285 It is for the national courts in the Member 
States to assess in every specific case if the person, whom the overcharge 
allegedly was passed on to, is legally able to claim compensation and the 
national courts will therefore only assess the merits of the passing-on-
defence when it is applicable.286 The formulation of the Proposed Directive 
regarding this matter has been questioned and it has been held that it creates 
an uncertainty for the defendants since all Member States applies different 
rules and principles as regards to, for example, causality. As a consequence, 
the risk of forum shopping may increase. Furthermore, it has been held that 
it is unclear for which persons it is “legally impossible” to claim 
compensation since the indirect purchasers are given a legal standing. It has 
also been questioned why the limit of passing-on-defence only refers to 
legal barriers and not practical barriers.287  
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The indirect purchaser standing is recognised in Article 13. The burden of 
proving that an overcharge has been passed on shall rest with the indirect 
purchaser (the claimant). However, as held above, the indirect purchaser 
will be able to rest on a rebuttable presumption that a passing-on to him or 
her occurred. The indirect purchaser must show three conditions for the 
presumption to apply: (1) that the defendant has infringed the competition 
law, (2) that the infringement resulted in an overcharge for the direct 
purchaser of the defendant, and, (3) that the indirect purchaser purchased 
goods or services that were subject of the infringement, or that the goods or 
services derived from or contained the goods or services that were subject of 
the infringement. As regards the quantification of the passing-on, the Article 
holds that the national courts of the Member States are empowered to 
estimate the share of the overcharge that has been passed on.  
 
Article 15 aims at eliminating the risk of multiple liability for the defendant, 
deriving from claims by different levels in the supply chain. In order to 
avoid inconsistent judgments within EU the Article aims at harmonising the 
assessment of the burden of proof among the Member States. The Article 
holds that the national courts shall take due account of actions related to the 
same infringement, but brought by different levels in the supply chain. 
Further, judgements resulting from such actions should be taken into 
account. Also Article 30 in Regulation No 1215/2012 contributes to avoid 
the risk of multiple proceedings within the EU by holding that “related 
actions” should be heard in the same proceeding. The actions are deemed to 
be related when so closely connected that it is expedient to hear the cases 
together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments.  
 
In absence of EU law, the national law of the Member States will govern the 
damages actions.288 One aspect not dealt with in the Proposal for Directive 
is the notion of causal relationship between the infringement and harm 
suffered. The issue of causality concerns the exercise of the right to 
compensation and is governed by the national rules of the Member States, 
however the EU principles of effectiveness and equivalence must be 
observed.289 Thus, it has been argued that the Member States are given a 
large amount of discretion after the implementation of the Proposed 
Directive, which creates a high degree of legal uncertainty.290 
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6 Analysis and Discussion  
6.1 The Justifications for a Passing-on-
defence 
It has been held that an implementation of the passing-on-defence implies a 
trade-off between the interests of fairness, effectiveness and efficiency since 
these interests conflict by nature. The interest of fairness requires that all 
victims of illegal behaviour are able to recover. In my view however the 
justification theory put forward by the doctrine ignores an important aspect 
as regards the fairness element: the infringer's possibility to escape liability 
in an action for damages by a claimant. It can be argued that the interest of 
fairness requires, except from the possibility for victims to recover, that the 
infringer is held responsible for his or her harmful actions. The ability for 
the infringer to escape liability for harm that he or she has caused is in this 
view not in compliance with the interest of fairness since it constitutes an 
unjust enrichment of the infringer. Hence, it may be argued that the fairness 
element is twofold and requires not only that victims are able to recover but 
also that the infringer are not able to enrich on his or her illegal behaviour.  
 
The recognition of a passing-on-defence may enhance the risk of an unjust 
enrichment of the infringer. For reasons described above, there is a risk that 
the indirect purchasers will not bring an action for damages when the 
passing-on-defence has been invoked by the infringer. The infringer may 
therefore escape liability to the extent that the passing-on-defence applies. 
This argument is based on the assumption that the direct purchasers are 
more effective enforcers than the indirect ones. It has been argued that in 
order to obtain the objective of deterrence, only the direct purchasers should 
have standing. The fairness interest however requires standing for all 
victims of competition law infringements. In my view, the interest of 
effectiveness aiming at deterrence of anti-competitive practices, does not 
necessarily conflict with the interest of fairness. Recognition of indirect 
purchaser standing may serve both the interests of fairness and the interest 
of effectiveness. A broad rule of standing aims at compensating all victims 
of an infringement. As is described above, it may also lead to multiply 
liability for the defendant. For obvious reason, such liability serves the 
interest of deterrence. This will however require that all victims entitled to 
compensation have effective procedural rules to rely on. In absence of such, 
there is a risk that the possibility to sue for damages will be impeded by 
procedural difficulties for the indirect purchasers, such as distance from the 
infringement, lack of information and difficulties in providing evidence. The 
system of private damages actions based on EU competition rules should 
therefore be complemented with procedural rules, making the private 
litigation effective, coherent and coordinated among the Member States. 
Such procedural rules would also serve the interest of efficiency since it 
mitigates the burdens on the judicial system.  
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The implementation of standing for indirect purchasers into EU law comes 
along with recognition of the passing-on-defence. The standing of indirect 
purchasers clearly serves the interest of fairness defined as full recovery for 
victims of competition law infringements. It the Commission succeeds in 
establishing effective procedural rules, it may also serve the second side of 
the fairness element and in some extent also the interest of deterrence and 
effectiveness. As shown above, the passing-on-defence is however not in 
compliance with the second side of the fairness element and the interest of 
deterrence and effectiveness since it allows the infringer to escape liability. 
Further, the interest of fairness and the ability for all victims to recover, 
conflicts with the interest of efficiency. This because recognition of standing 
for all victims implies an enhanced burden of the legal system. Such burden 
may however be mitigated by implementation of harmonised procedural 
rules as mentioned above.   
 
Since a trade-off between the different interests discussed above seems 
necessarily, priority should be given to the interest considered as the most 
important. Hence, the crucial question is which elements the law should 
serve. There is however, depending on how the interests are defined, a risk 
that none of the interests will be completely fulfilled. In 2001, the CJEU 
ruled that any victim of competition infringement must be able to recover. 
Since, the Court has repeatedly stated that the right to compensation for 
victims of competition violations is a matter of EU law. The Commission 
has for over a decade strived for a facilitation of damages actions based on 
EU competition law and has stressed that the main objective of such actions 
is the effective exercise of the right for victims to obtain full 
compensation.291 In the conflict between the elements justifying the passing-
on-defence and indirect purchaser standing, it therefore seems like priority 
should be given to the interest of fairness. Such approach is consistent with 
the case law of the CJEU and the aim of the Commission, which requires 
compensation for all victims of competition law infringements. The 
recognition of indirect purchaser standing serves such approach. Hence, as 
will be further discussed below, the solution in the Proposed Directive 
seems to be the most suitable for the EU since it well serves the objective of 
full compensation. The Proposed Directive is also important from a policy 
perspective since it can be argued that the Proposed Directive is consistent 
with the overall objective of EU competition law: maximising of consumer 
welfare. 
6.2 The Justifications of the Commission 
As discussed above, the Commission has encouraged a private enforcement 
entailing private litigation and damages claims in national courts for several 
years. It seems however like the approach of the Commission has changed 
regarding which interests that should be decisive in the establishment of 
such private litigation system. The passing-on-defence and indirect 
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purchaser standing were introduced as a matter of EU competition law for 
the first time in the Green Paper. In my opinion, there is reason to believe 
that the solution now implemented in the Proposal for Directive was not the 
solution that the Commission had in mind when published the Green Paper. 
In the Green Paper, the predominant focus aimed at efficiency and 
deterrence, however in the Proposed Directive the main focus aims at 
compensation and optimising the interaction between the public and private 
enforcement. The landmark Manfredi case in 2005 has probably influenced 
the approach of the Commission in several aspects. One may question if the 
Court’s ruling in the Manfredi case is to be regarded as a response to the 
Commission’s position in the Green Paper, wherein an effective 
enforcement was considered more important than absolute protection of the 
rights provided to individuals by the Treaty. There is much to suggest that 
the Commission did not consider the interest of fairness and the principle of 
full compensation to be as important as the objective of deterrence and 
effectiveness at the time of issuing of the Green Paper. In contrast, the 
Commission in the White Paper published after the ruling in the Manfredi 
case, emphasises that the guiding principle must be the objective of full 
compensation. It seems like the Commission hereby makes a clear policy 
choice and puts the objective of compensation above the interest of 
efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, the Commission in the White 
Paper makes a policy choice as regards the expressed worries among several 
stakeholders for excessive US litigation style in Europe. By emphasising the 
prominent role of public enforcement and a genuine European approach, the 
Commission rejects the fear of such US litigation style.  
 
According to the Commission, the White Paper includes measures and 
proposals that are rooted in the European legal culture and traditions. In my 
opinion, this statement of the Commission may however be questioned since 
the passing-on-defence has not been recognised as a matter of EU law 
within the field of competition law. The passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing appears not to be “rooted” in the European legal culture. 
This since neither the EU law provides legislation regarding the area, nor 
has the CJEU ruled on the subject. Moreover, some Member States 
recognise the defence in their national law, however several Member States 
has not taken the defence into closer consideration. It may therefore be 
argued that the passing-on-defence is a rather foreign matter in both EU law 
and the national law of the Member States. A question of interest is thus 
why the Commission addressed the issue in the Green Paper in the first 
place. To me, it seems like the Commission, in absence of a EU practice and 
a general widespread application of the defence in the Member States, was 
inspired of the US antitrust law and their application of the defence.  
 
It has been argued that the Commission had no choice but allowing indirect 
purchaser standing because of the Court’s ruling in the Manfredi case. In my 
opinion, it is questionable if the case law of the CJEU requires recognition 
of standing for indirect purchasers. As expressed in the comments to the 
White Paper, the Manfredi case just establish the rule of individuals right to 
compensation when harm has been suffered. Indeed, this is just a reflection 
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of the general principle that any person claiming damages must prove that 
he or she has suffered a loss. It does not follow from the case that a specific 
group of claimants should be favoured in legislation as now is proposed in 
the Proposal for Directive. Instead, it follows that the prospects of a 
successful damages claim is a question of proving harm and a causal 
relationship. The implementation of the passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing must however be seen in relation to the purpose of the 
Proposed Directive: facilitating damages actions based on EU competition 
law. In my opinion, a solution based on general principles of causation 
would not have been enough to achieve this aim, nor the objective of full 
compensation. This since such solution would not facilitate damages actions 
for claimants downstream in the distribution chain (e.g. consumers). If the 
possibility to recover was due solely to the establishment of a causal 
relationship, these claimants would still have difficulties in obtaining 
damages because of their distance from the infringer. The allowance of 
indirect purchaser standing will therefore most likely facilitate damages 
claims within the EU. The introduction of a legal standing for indirect 
purchasers will also serve the objective of full compensation of the 
Commission as well as the overall objective of consumer welfare within the 
EU.  
 
The Commission in the White Paper held that the principle established in 
the Manfredi case applies also to the indirect purchasers. This statement 
indicates that a requirement of causation for the indirect purchasers still 
applies. In my opinion, the implementation of the passing-on-defence and 
indirect purchaser standing is not desirable, nor necessary, if the indirect 
purchasers still must show a causal relationship in order to obtain damages. 
In accordance with the Proposed Directive, it is “legally impossible” for 
some persons to claim compensation due to national rules of causality. It 
can be argued that this provision does not refer to the indirect purchasers 
since they have been given legal standing and also the presumption that the 
overcharge has been passed on to them to rely on. Further, it would seem 
impractical if the intention of the Commission is to facilitate damages 
claims for the indirect purchasers but these still have to show causality. The 
statement of the Commission presented above however suggests that this 
issue has to be solved by the national courts in a near future.  
 
Another question is if an implementation of indirect purchaser standing also 
requires recognition of the passing-on-defence. The US example, with a 
parallel application of federal law denying defendants to invoke the passing-
on-defence and state law allowing indirect purchasers to sue for damages, 
shows that one of the measures should not be allowed without recognising 
of the other. The US example of multiple and duplicative lawsuits and 
liability, burdening the judicial system, has been described as a chaotic 
environment and should, according to my opinion, be raised as example of a 
poor solution. Even though it is my opinion that the passing-on-defence and 
indirect purchaser standing should be seen as mirror images of each other, it 
may be argued that there are other solutions, neither discussed by the 
Commission in the Proposal for Directive nor in their preparatory work. The 
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allowance of standing of both direct and indirect purchasers may be 
complemented with other measures than the passing-on-defence in order to 
avoid duplicative compensation, e.g. res judicata. Such measure would 
prevent multiple liability for the same damage and the same infringement. 
The solution of direct and indirect purchasers as joint creditors and the 
issuing of TPN in Germany can be raised as another example. In my 
opinion, it is notable that the Commission has not presented any other 
solutions or reason about other options in their preparatory work, leading to 
the Proposed Directive.     
6.3 The US Law 
When examining and comparing the US antitrust law with the EU 
competition law, it is clear that different interests and elements justifies the 
use of the passing-on-defence in the legal systems. In US law, the direct 
purchasers are clearly favoured. The denial of passing-on-defence and 
indirect purchaser standing in US federal antitrust law implies that direct 
purchasers can obtain damages for the entire overcharge by the infringer, 
regardless of the fact that hole or part of that overcharge have been passed 
on to the indirect purchasers. The justification for denial of both the passing-
on-defence and indirect purchaser standing is the interest of effectiveness. 
Both the Hanover Shoe case and the Illinois Brick case stresses that the 
interests of effectiveness and deterrence require that only the direct 
purchasers have standing. It is argued that such solution will imply that the 
antitrust laws are enforced more effectively by concentrating the full 
recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers.  
 
The US approach of effectiveness mainly is in notion of deterrence. The 
imposing of criminal penalties along with the imprisonment for violation of 
the US antitrust law clearly demonstrates the aim of deterrence. Another 
aspect suggesting that the US law primarily aims at deterrence of anti-
competitive behaviour is the automatically reward of treble damages in 
antitrust cases. An interesting aspect that should be noticed is the statement 
of the Commission, inspired by the US, that an implementation of double 
damages into EU law should be considered. However not implemented in 
the Proposal for Directive, the statement demonstrates the Commission’s 
earlier approach regarding the role of private litigation in EU competition 
law. It also supports my finding that the Commission has changed approach 
during the decade wherein the implementation of private damages claims 
has been encouraged. Their approach has changed from focus on deterrence, 
effectiveness and efficiency, to stressing the aim of full compensation. 
 
The rulings in the US cases clearly show that the interest of effectiveness 
and deterrence is regarded as the most important and that the fairness 
interest has to stand back in the US law. However, as stated above, there is 
another perspective of the interest of fairness as well: the infringer should 
not gain on his or her illegal behaviour. This interest goes hand in hand with 
the interest of deterrence. According to my opinion, the US law most likely 
fulfil this aspect of the fairness interest since it is often argued that the direct 
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purchasers are the most effective enforcers. Hence, due to the exclusive 
enforcement of the direct purchasers it is likely that the infringer will be 
liable for damages for harm caused by the infringement. However, as raised 
by the Court in the Illinois Brick case, the argument that the direct 
purchasers are the most effective enforcers may be questioned. There is 
reason to believe that the direct purchasers in practice are very reluctant in 
suing a contractor. For example, it would most likely be costly, both in time 
and money to end a business relationship with a supplier and find a new 
one. This since the company may have had the same supplier for years and 
thereof adjusted its operations after that supplier. Hence, there is reason to 
believe that indirect purchasers may have an equal, if not in some cases 
greater, interest in suing for damages, however practical aspects such as 
barriers of information and evidence may complicate the actions of indirect 
purchasers. The establishment of procedural rules may also imply that 
indirect purchasers are given an enhanced incentive to sue. The possibility 
of collective redress implemented by the Proposed Directive into EU law is 
one example of such procedural measure.  
 
The comparison between US antitrust law and EU competition law shows 
that the laws serves different objectives and interests. The overall objective 
of EU competition law aims at economic and consumer welfare. The private 
litigation of EU competition rules aims at compensation. The allowance of 
indirect purchaser standing well serves these objectives. Furthermore, the 
EU competition law is mainly enforced through public enforcement and the 
absence of private litigation and private damages claims is palpable. In 
contrast to EU competition law, the US antitrust law is mainly based on 
litigation and private damages actions. The element of fairness in allowing 
all injured compensation is ignored under US law. In practice, consumers 
are typically indirect purchasers and it may therefore be argued that the 
protection of consumer welfare is not pleased within the US.  
 
So, what can the EU learn from the US? According to my opinion, the most 
important lesson for the EU is that in recognising the passing-on-defence, 
the indirect purchaser standing should also be acknowledged. It is of great 
importance that the measures implemented in EU law are complemented by 
harmonised procedure rules, minimising the risk of multiple damages claims 
by different claimants in different Member States regarding the same 
infringement. The US as an example characterised of wasteful proceedings, 
multiple damages claims, divergence in judgements and inconsistent 
recoveries is definitely not a desirable development for the EU. 
6.4 The Arguments of Passing-on-defence 
6.4.1 The Argument of Unjust Enrichment 
The argument of unjust enrichment is two-fold. At one hand, there is the 
unjust enrichment of the direct purchaser if he or she is awarded damages 
for harm that has been passed on. On the other hand, there is the unjust 
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enrichment of the infringer, occurring if the infringer eludes liability for 
harm that he or she has caused. The issue of unjust enrichment is complex 
since the fear of enriching the claimant may, on the contrary, lead to an 
enrichment of the infringer. Hence, it seems like a trade-off is inevitable – 
what is preferable, an unjust enrichment of the direct purchaser or of the 
infringer? Recognition of the passing-on-defence entails that the direct 
purchaser has to stand the risk of being undercompensated, while the 
infringer is enriched. A denial of the defence however implies a risk of 
overcompensating the direct purchaser. It therefore seems like the issue is 
one of risk allocation and whom that should bear the risk. 
 
If the risk is allocated to the direct purchaser, it may be argued that the 
burden of that purchaser is dual. Initially, the direct purchaser may suffer 
harm because of an infringement of competition law and, secondly, the 
same bears the risk not being able to achieve compensation for the harm 
suffered. The fact that a purchaser has suffered harm does not entail that he 
or she is able to prove that harm has been suffered in a subsequent damages 
action in a court. A direct purchaser, who is not able to prove that he or she 
has suffered harm and hence is entitled to damages, seems to bear a 
comprehensive burden. If not successful in the action for damages, the 
purchaser is not only unable to recover but also left with the legal costs and 
the costs in time for bringing proceedings. Contrariwise, the relief of the 
infringer seems dual, first the infringer gains from his or her infringement of 
competition law and then he or she is able to benefit from the infringement 
by not being liable for damages for harm that the infringer has caused.  
 
As held by Strand and according to my opinion, there is too much focus on 
preventing the direct purchaser from making an unjust enrichment. To me, it 
seems like the infringer is the one really making the unjust enrichment, 
benefitting from his or her own infringement of competition law. Placing 
the risk with the infringer also seems to serve the interest of deterrence. As 
stated above, this is a question on risk allocation. Should the claimant or the 
infringer bear the risk? In my opinion the answer is clear – why should an 
already harmed claimant also bear the risk of not getting compensated to the 
benefit of the infringer? In such cases, excess in damages to the claimant is 
preferable. Again, a trade-off must be made – one must be favoured at the 
expense of the other. The real matter is how the interests of the claimant and 
the infringer should be balanced against each other. The Proposal for 
Directive clarifies that the Commission considers the interest of the direct 
purchaser be less important then the interest of the infringer since the latter 
is allowed to invoke the passing-on-defence. The approach of the 
Commission must however be seen in relation to the discussion above and 
the Manfredi case, which gives the Commission limited discretion 
concerning the indirect purchaser standing. The burden of proof for showing 
that the passing-on-defence applies is in the Proposed Directive placed with 
the infringer, implying that the risk of the claimant is mitigated. 
    
Another aspect of the argument of unjust enrichment is the question of when 
an injury occurs. Initially, the view held by Strand and also the Supreme 
 59 
Court in US appears to be justified – regardless of the response in acting of 
the direct purchasers or subsequent circumstances, the purchaser should be 
entitled to damages. However this is not in line with regular tort law since in 
tort law a person is only entitled to damages if he or she can show that harm 
actually has been suffered. Further, he or she must be able to prove the 
presence of a causal relationship between the action and the harm suffered. 
Consequently, one is not entitled to damages just because an incident occurs 
since other circumstances must be present and shown in evidence. 
Furthermore, the reasoning of the Supreme Court and Strand seems to be 
inconsistent with the duty of the claimant (the injured party) to mitigate the 
loss and damage suffered, which is a legal principle incorporated in several 
Member States’ legal systems. To complicate the scenario further, in 
competition cases it is common that the buyer (the claimant, the direct 
purchaser or the indirect purchaser) does not have knowledge of an 
infringement occurring and the resulting overcharge. In such case, no duty 
of mitigate loss can exist.    
 
Moreover, an aspect of the argument of unjust enrichment is the more 
practical one in deciding how much of an overcharge that has been passed 
on. In this aspect, the Proposal for Directive must be said to advocate a 
well-balanced solution, placing the burden of proving that the overcharge 
has been passed on, on the infringer. In contrast to France that has chosen 
the opposite solution in their legal system, the solution in the Proposed 
Directive is preferable. The French solution places a double burden on the 
claimant, making it difficult for the claimant to obtain damages and risks 
offending the EU principle of effectiveness.     
 
As is held above, Strand is of the opinion that there may be an incentive to 
infringe competition law if the infringers are not disenriched. Further, 
Strand argues that in order to meet the objective of deterrence the private 
enforcement must address this issue. Even though I consider that the 
infringer should be disenriched, Strand seems to overlook that the public 
enforcement by the Commission and the NCA aims at complementing the 
private enforcement by the national courts. Public sanctions are available 
under the public enforcement and the Commission and the NCA are entitled 
to impose fines on infringers of competition law. Thereby, it may be argued 
that any incentive to violate competition law is deterred by the 
complementary public enforcement. The crucial question is therefore which 
roles the private and the public enforcement should play within the 
competition system. This matter will be further discussed below.       
6.4.2 The Argument of Multiple Damages and 
Liability 
The main argument in recognising the passing-on-defence is that infringers 
should not be liable for multiple damages. The Proposed Directive implies 
that both direct and indirect purchasers can claim damages based on the 
same infringement. If the infringer is unsuccessful in litigation against both 
the direct purchaser and the indirect purchaser, the infringer will be liable of 
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multiple damages. Hence, it has been held that the Proposed Directive may 
not be the most effective solution if the main objective is to avoid multiple 
damages. In such case, the US solution denying both the passing-on-defence 
and indirect purchaser standing may be preferable. The US solution is 
however not possible within the EU since the EU law requires that anyone 
who has suffered harm because of an infringement of EU law can obtain full 
compensation for that harm. A solution like the one in the US law would 
thus require an overruling of the Courage and the Manfredi cases. Besides, 
it would oppose the main objective of full compensation emphasised by the 
Commission. Regarding the US law, Landes and Posner in 1979 argued that 
there is only two ways in avoiding multiple damages: overrule the Hanover 
Shoe case and allow both the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser 
standing, or exclude both measures. Since 1979, several repealer statues 
have been issued in the US states, allowing indirect purchasers to sue. 
Hence, it seems like Landes and Posner could not predict that the current 
solution in US also would lead to multiple damages and liability.  
 
When recognising both the passing-on-defence and the indirect purchaser 
standing, the risk of multiple liability for the infringer is depending on the 
burden of proof. The Proposal for Directive places the burden of proving 
that an overcharge has been passed on, on the infringer. In addition, the 
indirect purchasers can rely on a rebuttable presumption that an overcharge 
has passed on. The Proposed Directive increases the risk of multiple liability 
of the infringer since the infringer may neither be able to fulfil the burden of 
proof, nor rebut the presumption. The actual burden put upon the infringer 
depends on the strength in evidence required to fulfil the burden of proof 
and to rebut the presumption. It is too early to comment and assess if the 
burden of proof is justified since it is due to the application of the national 
courts of the Member States. In the interest of consistency between 
judgments within the EU, Article 15 in the Proposed Directive aims at 
harmonising the assessment of the burden of proof among the Member 
States. Article 30 in Regulation No 1215/2012 will also contribute to 
avoiding duplicative and multiple liability (lis pendens) from related actions 
in the different Member States. Despite these Articles, I believe that there is 
a risk of diverging judgements within the EU since the national courts of the 
Member States may assess the burden of proof for the defendant differently. 
There is also reason to believe that these provisions will be insufficient to 
avoid such multiple liability of the infringer as is explained above. Article 
30 in Regulation No 1215/2012 aims at preventing irreconcilable 
judgments, however there is much to suggest that a diverse assessment in 
the burden of proof will not be considered as irreconcilable. Since Article 15 
in the Proposed Directive only requires the Member States to take “due 
account” to related actions and judgements, this provision is more to be seen 
as a guiding principle. It will probably be difficult to apply in practice since 
it does not set any material requirements upon the national courts. However, 
the Member States ability to request a preliminary ruling of the CJEU as 
regards the burden of proof may provide clarity as regards the legal position. 
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The rebuttable presumption for the indirect purchasers to rely on implies 
that the defendants are exposed for a bigger risk of multiple liability since 
they may not be able to prove that an overcharge has passed, nor rebut the 
presumption. As is seems, it will be relatively easy for an indirect purchaser 
to show that a passing-on to him or her occurred (i.e. fulfil the 
presumption). Since most actions for damages in competition cases will be 
so-called follow on cases, meaning that the Commission or the NCA already 
have acted on the infringement in their role of public enforcement, the first 
condition showing that the defendant has committed an infringement of 
competition law will be easy to show. The second condition, showing that 
the infringement resulted in an overcharge for the direct purchaser of the 
defendant, is most likely also met easily since most infringements of 
competition law inevitable implies an overcharge for the direct purchaser. If 
the infringer were not able to take an overcharge of the direct purchaser, 
there would be no reason/incentive for him or her to infringe the law. Lastly, 
the indirect purchaser shall show that he or she purchased goods or services 
subject or derived from the infringement. If already shown that an 
infringement occurred, this last condition will probably not be difficult for 
the indirect purchaser to fulfill.  
 
Clearly, it will most likely be easy for the indirect purchaser to show that a 
passing-on of an overcharge has occurred. However, it is unclear how 
comprehensive the burden of proof for the infringer to rebut the 
presumption will be. It has been held that the presumption favouring the 
indirect purchasers will be significantly difficult for the defendant to rebut 
in practice. According to my opinion, this burden should not be too great 
since such legal solution would increase the risk of multiple liability of the 
infringer. However, it should neither be set to low since that would risk the 
full effectiveness of the EU law. If it is too easy for the infringer to rebut the 
presumption it will, in practice, be difficult for the indirect purchasers to 
obtain compensation. As discussed above, the strength in the burden of 
proof will be a question of risk allocation and which party that should bear 
the risk. In my opinion and for reasons described above, this risk should rest 
with the infringer. Such solution will also serve the aim of deterrence of 
anti-competitive behavior.  
 
It can be questioned if the risk of multiple liability even should be taken into 
consideration. There is reason to believe that this risk in many cases is 
limited since the indirect purchasers often is positioned far from the 
infringer in the distribution chain and lacks information about the 
infringement and its impact on the indirect purchaser. In my opinion, the 
main aim of the Proposed Directive is not to prevent multiple liability of the 
infringer. I consider that the risk of multiple liability for the infringer is 
regarded as less important than the possibility for all harmed individuals to 
obtain compensation. The current solution in the Proposed Directive 
enhances the risk of multiple liability compare to other solutions, such as the 
one chosen in US federal antitrust law. Also the burden of proof placed on 
the defendant and the rebuttable presumption for the indirect purchaser to 
rely on, enhances the risk of multiple liability for the infringer. In my 
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opinion, the Commission has done a correct balance between the interest of 
the infringers and the interest of the victims regarding this matter. In 
accordance with the argument of Strand, the Commission seems to embrace 
the risk of multiple liability. Such approach serves the interest of deterrence. 
As discussed above, EU competition law does not provide double or treble 
damages, as is the case in the US. Bearing this in mind, a risk for multiple 
damages in the EU context should be acceptable.  
 
6.5 The Roles of Public and Private 
Enforcement 
To me, the most important query as regards the implementation of the 
passing-on-defence and the elements justifying such implementation, is 
which purpose the private enforcement should serve in the context of EU 
competition law. As is held above, it is argued among the doctrine that the 
private enforcement of competition law should aim also at deterrence and 
not only at compensation. According to my opinion, the role and aim of the 
private enforcement must be discussed in relation to the public enforcement 
because of the interaction between them. 
 
When designing a litigation system based on competition law within the 
EU, the ultimate question will be which role the public enforcement of the 
Commission and NCA will have on one hand, and which role the private 
enforcement of individuals bringing damages actions in the national courts 
should play on the other hand in the EU system. In EU, public enforcement 
has traditionally been the main enforcement. Imposing fines on 
undertakings infringing the competition law is the main measure used by the 
Commission and the NCA in their public enforcement. Under public 
enforcement, victims of competition infringements cannot obtain 
compensation since the imposed fines accrues the public. The EU public 
enforcement thereof only aims at serving the interests of effectiveness and 
deterrence. The private enforcement should therefore be used 
complementary to serve other interests, in order to fulfil as many interests as 
possible. To obtain an effective system of enforcement, it is of my opinion 
that the private enforcement of EU competition law should aim at 
compensation for victims. The objective of compensation and the interest of 
fairness cannot be served by the public enforcement. Hence, since the 
system of public and private enforcement should complement each other, 
too much focus should not be given to the objective of deterrence regarding 
the private damages actions based on competition law. Instead, the 
discussion should concern how the public enforcement can obtain the 
objective of deterrence. The objective of full compensation should be the 
decisive for the creation of private damages actions since the only way to 
obtain compensation for victims is through the private enforcement.  
 
If the reasoning above should be valid, the public enforcement must be 
effective in order to serve the interest of deterrence to the fullest. The public 
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enforcement must have access to effective tools in order to reveal 
infringements of competition law and the fines must be high enough to deter 
from infringements. In my opinion, the Commission and the NCA should 
seek to maintain a strong public enforcement and continue to develop tools 
in the pursuit of achieving a more effective system. If the public 
enforcement maintains its strong position in the enforcement system, the 
private enforcement can primarily aim at serving the purpose of 
compensation. Furthermore, if the Commission is successful in the 
promotion of private damages actions, liability for damages will be rule 
rather than exception. In such case, the private enforcement would most 
likely also serve the aim of deterrence. 
 
Within the US the private enforcement and private litigation, automatically 
awarding victims of competition law infringements treble damages, clearly 
serves the aim of deterrence. Private parties by litigation mainly enforce the 
competition law and accordingly the public enforcement in the US does not 
have such prominent role as within the EU. In EU, deterrence features like 
double or treble damages are conspicuously absent in the private 
enforcement regime. Further, the private enforcement is considered as a 
complement to the public enforcement and it is with this in mind that the 
matter of enforcement of EU competition law shall be faced. Since the 
strong tradition of public enforcement within the EU, the damages awarded 
must be proportional to the public sanctions.   
 
It is my opinion that the objective of deterrence should rest with the public 
enforcement and that the fairness and compensation interests should be 
regarded as the most important for the private enforcement to fulfil. 
Recognition of the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing well 
serves the fairness interest and objective of full compensation since it 
provides all victims standing in a damages action based on an infringement 
of competition law. Furthermore, it serves the overall EU objective of 
consumer welfare. In my opinion, the private enforcement and the 
implemented measures in the Proposed Directive should not strive at obtain 
the objectives of effectiveness and deterrence – these interests should be 
served by the public enforcement. When possible, the public and private 
enforcement should be combined and aiming at complementing each other. 
There may be scenarios when the objective of full compensation is fulfilled 
and the aim of deterrence could be met to some extent at the same time. In 
such case, the private enforcement should aim at fulfilling both. However, 
achieving the objective of deterrence should never be on behalf of the aim 
of full compensation. 
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7 Conclusions 
Initially, three questions were asked and these will now be answered. My 
first question is if the proposed EU law on passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing are founded on the same justifications and values as the 
US law on the same matters. If the answer to this question is no, my 
supplementary question is which distinguishing features that can be found in 
the different jurisdictions. My conclusion is that the passing-on-defence in 
US law and in EU law is clearly based on different values and justifications. 
The justifications for denial of both the passing-on-defence and indirect 
purchaser standing in the US antitrust law are the interests of effectiveness 
and deterrence. Traditionally, the US antitrust law has had a more economic 
approach than its European counterpart. Contrary, in EU law the 
justification for allowing both the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser 
standing is the interest of fairness. In EU competition law the overall 
objective aims at economic and consumer welfare and the EU law is thereby 
more consumer and social orientated than its US counterpart. It is clear that 
the main objective of the Proposed Directive and the private litigation of the 
EU competition rules aims at compensation, not litigation. The EU law on 
passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing allows all victims of 
competition law infringements to recover and the EU principle of full 
compensation requires recognition of standing for all claimants suffered 
harm. Hence, the US solution had not been possible to implement into EU 
law since such approach is contrary to the fundamental objectives and 
values of EU law. The features distinguishing the US law from the EU law 
are the exclusive enforcement of the direct purchasers, the litigation culture, 
the award of treble damages and the penalties for violations of the antitrust 
law. All these instruments serve the interests of deterrence and effectiveness 
in the US system. 
 
My second question regards the implemented measures compatibility with 
the objective by the Commission of full compensation and the overall 
objective of consumer welfare. My initial conclusion is that the passing-on-
defence and indirect purchaser standing must necessarily stand together. The 
rulings in the Courage and the Manfredi cases imply that standing cannot be 
denied to a specific group of claimants under EU law. The indirect 
purchaser standing clearly serves the objective of full compensation since it 
allows all claimants to bring an action for damages. Hence, the chosen 
solution recognising both passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser 
standing is in accordance with the principle of full compensation stated by 
the Commission. The argument that the Manfredi case requires recognising 
of indirect purchaser standing is in my opinion incorrect. The only thing 
required according to the Manfredi case is that all individuals who have 
suffered harm should be able to obtain damages if a causal relationship 
applies. Since the Commission already in the Green Paper decided to either 
recognise the passing-on-defence in legislation or explicitly deny the 
defence, the now chosen solution of recognising both the passing-on-
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defence and indirect purchaser standing is the only option that is consistent 
with EU law according to the initial conclusion. Recognising of indirect 
purchasers standing will facilitate the possibility for victims distant from the 
infringer, such as consumers, to obtain compensation in order to recover 
from a violation of competition law. Such approach serves the overall 
objective of consumer welfare of EU competition law as well as the main 
objective of the private enforcement of damages actions for breach of EU 
competition law: full compensation. If not given standing, the requirement 
of causal relationship established in the Manfredi case would apply, making 
it difficult in practice for consumers and purchasers downstream the 
distribution chain to obtain compensation. Moreover, the burden of proof 
placed on the infringer and the rebuttable presumption for the indirect 
purchasers to rely on, serves both the objective of full compensation and 
consumer welfare since such solution facilitates damages claims for all 
claimants. A different solution would risk offending the EU principle of full 
effectiveness since, in practice, it would be a significant task for the 
claimant to obtain compensation. The implementation of the passing-on-
defence implies that the damage for which compensation can be required 
will be spread and distributed among a larger group of victims, each of them 
probably less incentive to sue. Hence, the establishment of an effective 
system for the indirect purchasers to claim damages and the harmonisation 
of procedural rules will be of great importance. This in order to mitigate the 
potential dilution effect that otherwise would curb the objective of consumer 
welfare.  
 
My third question concerns the objective of the Commission of optimising 
the interaction between the public and the private enforcement. This stated 
objective evokes the question of which roles the public enforcement and the 
private enforcement respectively should play regarding the implementation 
of passing-on-defence in order to achieve this objective. My conclusion is 
that the private enforcement mainly should serve the interest of fairness and 
compensation for victims of competition infringements. An effective system 
of private damages actions based on EU competition law will also serve the 
aim of deterrence to some extent, since the fear of infringers for liability of 
damages. Concerning the public enforcement, my conclusion is that such 
should solely aim at deterrence and effectiveness since the public 
enforcement never can serve the objective of compensation. In my opinion, 
the passing-on-defence and indirect purchaser standing will under these 
conditions serve the aim of optimising the interaction between the public 
and the private enforcement, where the latter complement the former and, to 
the extent possible, also serve the objectives of effectiveness and deterrence. 
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Supplement A 
CHAPTER IV 
PASSING-ON OF OVERCHARGES 
 
Article 12 
Passing-on defence 
1. Member States shall ensure that the defendant in an action for 
damages can invoke as a defence against a claim for damages the 
fact that the claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge 
resulting from the infringement. The burden of proving that the 
overcharge was passed on shall rest with the defendant. 
 
2. Insofar as the overcharge has been passed on to persons at the next 
level of the supply chain for whom it is legally impossible to claim 
compensation for their harm, the defendant shall not be able to 
invoke the defence referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
 
 
Article 13 
Indirect purchasers 
1. Member States shall ensure that, where in an action for damages the 
existence of a claim for damages or the amount of compensation to 
be awarded depends on whether — or to what degree — an 
overcharge was passed on to the claimant, the burden of proving the 
existence and scope of such pass-on shall rest with the claimant. 
 
2. In the situation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the indirect 
purchaser shall be deemed to have proven that a passing-on to him 
occurred where he has shown that: 
(a) the defendant has committed an infringement of competition 
law; 
(b) the infringement resulted in an overcharge for the direct 
purchaser of the defendant; and 
(c) he purchased the goods or services that were the subject of the 
infringement, or purchased goods or services derived from or 
containing the goods or services that were the subject of the 
infringement. 
Member States shall ensure that the court has the power to estimate 
which share of that overcharge was passed on. 
 
This paragraph shall be without prejudice to the infringer’s right to 
show that the overcharge was not, or not entirely, passed on to the 
indirect purchaser. 
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Article 14 
Loss of profits and infringement at supply level 
1. The rules laid down in this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the 
right of an injured party to claim compensation for loss of profits. 
 
2. Member States shall ensure that the rules laid down in this Chapter 
apply accordingly where the infringement of competition law relates 
to supply to the infringing undertaking. 
 
 
Article 15 
Actions for damages by claimants from different levels in the supply chain 
1. Member States shall ensure that, in assessing whether the burden of 
proof resulting from the application of Article 13 is satisfied, 
national courts seized of an action for damages take due account of 
(a) actions for damages that are related to the same infringement 
of competition law, but are brought by claimants from other 
levels in the supply chain; or 
(b) judgments resulting from such actions. 
 
2. This Article shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations 
of national courts under Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 
1215/2012. 
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